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a b s t r a c t 
Why do shops cluster in shopping streets? We argue that retail firms benefit from shopping externalities. We 
identify these externalities for the main Dutch shopping streets by estimating the effect of footfall – the number 
of pedestrians that pass by – and the number of shops in the vicinity on store owners’ rental income. We address 
endogeneity issues by exploiting spatial variation within shopping streets combined with historic long-lagged 
instruments. Our estimates imply an elasticity of rental income with respect to footfall as well as number of shops 
in the vicinity of (at least) 0.25. We show that these shopping externalities are unlikely to be internalised. It follows 
that substantial subsidies to shop owners are welfare improving, seemingly justifying current policies. Finally, 
we find limited evidence for heterogeneity between retail firms located in shopping streets in their willingness 





































One of the main reasons that people choose to live in the city is the
resence of a rich variety of consumer goods and services offered by the
etail sector ( Glaeser et al., 2001 ). Shops tend to be concentrated either
n pedestrian shopping streets and shopping districts, often located in
ity centres, or in shopping malls in the suburbs. In Europe, shops are
ostly concentrated in pedestrian streets. Walking in those streets is so
mportant that the majority of all pedestrian movements occur while
hopping. 3 ☆ We thank Locatus and HISGIS for providing data. The editor Stuart Rosenthal, 
wo anonymous referees, Sergej Gubin, Jordi Jofre-Monseny, Albert Sollé-Ollé, 
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hiba (Japan), the London School of Economics and participants of the Urban 
conomics Association conferences in Copenhagen and Vienna. This paper has 
een prepared within the framework of the HSE University Basic Research Pro- 
ram and funded by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ‘5-100’. 
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094-1190/© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Arguably, the most important reason for retail firms to cluster is the
resence of positive shopping externalities, which are generated by con-
umers’ ‘trip-chaining’ behaviour. Shopping externalities have a simple
ogic. In retail markets where customers have to visit stores, transporta-
ion costs are paid by customers and incurred on a shopping trip basis
 Claycombe, 1991 ). Consumers who visit several shops benefit from re-
uctions in transport and search costs. In the context of shopping streets,
 retail firm’s productivity function depends on local footfall – the num-
er of pedestrians that pass by a shop. Footfall tends to be higher in ar-
as with more shops, since pedestrians are attracted to areas with many
hops. Hence, the associated reductions in costs for consumers imply a
ositive shopping externality for retail firms, which is enhanced when
ultiple retail firms are located in close proximity ( Eaton and Lipsey,
982; Claycombe, 1991; Schulz and Stahl, 1996 ). Similar to other ag-
lomeration advantages, these shopping externalities are expected to
apitalise into store owners’ rental income. 4 
In the empirical literature, however, little attention has been given to
he importance of shopping externalities. The few studies that measure
hopping externalities focus on U.S. shopping malls (see Pashigian and
ould, 1998 ). However, retail activity in European cities is mainly con-4 In retail markets, agglomeration economies occur locally, so capitalisation 
nto employees’ wages is hardly relevant. In contrast, in non-retail markets, ag- 
lomeration advantages are more dispersed and mainly capitalise into wages 
see e.g. Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008 ). 














































































































r  entrated in shopping streets while shopping malls are far less common. 5 
o the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that quantifies shop-
ing externalities in shopping streets. 
Shopping streets are characterised by a different form of retail or-
anisation than shopping malls. In contrast to shopping malls, we will
how that property ownership in shopping streets is highly fragmented
nd that each shop is only a minor player locally. As a consequence,
nternalisation of shopping externalities is unlikely to occur in shopping
treets. 6 Thus, public policies that foster retail concentration by provid-
ng subsidies are potentially welfare improving. 7 
We focus on the full population of main shopping streets in one coun-
ry: the Netherlands. An important feature of shopping streets is that
hey are dominated by clothing stores (30%), cafés/restaurants (16%)
nd food stores (10%). The main strategy followed by the retail firms in
hese sectors is to differentiate themselves by supplying heterogeneous
roducts. This is in sharp contrast to other retail sectors that are ex-
mined in the economic literature, which offer homogeneous products
nd where spatial differentiation is the main strategy ( e.g. gas stations,
ovie theatres, or video retailers, see Netz and Taylor, 2002; Davis,
006; Seim, 2006 , respectively). 
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we employ two
easures of shopping externalities. Our first measure, footfall , is novel
n the agglomeration literature. 8 We will argue that footfall captures
hopping externalities rather precisely, also because measures of footfall
redominantly include shoppers who visit several shops. As a second
easure of shopping externalities we use the number of shops in the
icinity. The latter is a more standard proxy for externalities, which
s in line with a large literature on agglomeration economies (see e.g
ombes et al., 2008; Melo et al., 2009 ). 
A second contribution of the paper lies in an explicit treatment of het-
rogeneity. One may suspect that there is heterogeneity in the benefits
f shopping externalities. For example, shops that are part of a chain are
ore likely to locate in streets with high levels of footfall. Using semi-
arametric regression techniques we show that heterogeneity between
rms in terms of marginal willingness to pay for footfall is limited. For
xample, shops belong to chains and other shops have roughly the same
arginal willingness to pay for footfall. Note that this suggests that store
wners cannot, or do not, discriminate between different types of retail
rms in setting the rent. 
The third, and main, contribution of the current paper is the identifi-
ation of shopping externalities by estimating the causal effect of footfall
n the rental income of store owners, which we derive by estimating
he causal effects of footfall on the rent paid by tenants as well as on
he probability that a retail property lies empty. We will address several
ources of endogeneity by exploiting spatial variation within shopping
treets, combined with the use of a range of control variables ( e.g. , size
f property, shopping chain fixed effects) and an instrumental variable
pproach. 5 Shopping mall floor space per person is more than tenfold in the U.S. com- 
ared to Europe (2150 m 2 per 1000 people in the U.S. compared to 182 m 2 per 
000 people in Europe in 2011, see Cushman & Cushman, 2011 ). 
6 In shopping malls, store owners set the rent based on retail firms’ revenues 
nd thus, shopping externalities are internalised. More specifically, shopping 
all real estate managers charge lower rents to footfall-generating shops (or 
anchor stores’), which could be regarded as a first-best subsidy. Hence, there is 
o room for public policy to improve welfare ( Brueckner, 1993; Pashigian and 
ould, 1998; Konishi and Sandfort, 2003 ). 
7 Many examples of such subsidies can be given, although these subsidies tend 
o be implicit. For example, in many European countries, in particular Germany, 
olicies have created pedestrian areas. The latter implies implicit subsidies to 
ocal store owners, as the advantages are local, whereas the disadvantages of 
rohibiting car use in these areas fall on other agents. Subsidies to parking close 
o shopping clusters, and subsidies to park-and-ride facilities, including free pub- 
ic transport towards city centres, are other relevant examples. 
8 In the retail industry, footfall is a standard measure to explain the attrac- 















To be more specific, as emphasised in the agglomeration literature,
oth our measures of shopping externalities, i.e. footfall and number of
hops in the vicinity, are essentially measures of spatial concentration
hat may be endogenous because they tend to be positively correlated
o unobserved attractive location characteristics. We address this issue
y focusing on shops that are located within the same shopping street
nd are therefore close to each other. 9 This strategy largely addresses
he issue that footfall and number of shops in the vicinity are generated
y local amenities and accessibility. We further control for a wide range
f shop and street characteristics, as well as local amenities that may
enerate footfall that is not related to shopping, such as the number
f schools, public buildings and religious buildings. Furthermore, using
eb-scraped data from FlickR , we control for the number of pictures
aken by tourists and residents in the shopping street, which proxy for
ifficult-to-capture differences in amenities and attractiveness within a
treet ( Gaigné et al., 2018 ). 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that endogeneity issues are still present
or both measures of shopping externalities due to measurement er-
or and reverse causation issues, which would yield an underestimate
f shopping externalities. We believe there are three reasons which
ay cause reverse causation. First, attractive, and therefore expensive,
treets disproportionally attract shops with high-end brands ( e.g. Louis
itton, Giorgio Armani). These shops generate little footfall, so that
here is a downward bias of the estimated footfall coefficient. In the
utch context, the main example is the P.C. Hooftstraat in Amsterdam,
ut one observes the same phenomenon in well-known shopping streets
n other countries (New Bond Street, London; Champs-Élysées, Paris;
ia Monte Napoleone, Milan; Bahnhofstrasse, Zurich). Second, a retail
rm that signs a contract to pay high fixed rents may be more likely to
work hard’ to generate footfall (and, therefore, sales) in order to en-
ure that it can afford these rents. Third, one may argue that there is a
imultaneity problem (which usually does not occur in a hedonic price
etting), because we consider the aggregate number of shops (and foot-
all) in a location, which would fall with rents, as in a standard textbook
upply-demand setting with a homogeneous good. 10 
Endogeneity issues also play a role when focusing on the effects on
acancies. For example, a higher level of vacancies in a street will likely
nduce less foot traffic and, mechanically, reduce the small number of
on-vacant stores in the vicinity. 
To address these endogeneity issues, we will employ an instrumen-
al variables approach using the exact location of cinemas in 1930. Be-
ause there is a high autocorrelation of retail locations, it appears that
he number of cinemas in 1930 has a strong effect on footfall and on
umber of shops in the vicinity. This is not too surprising: for example,
he maim shopping street in Amsterdam nowadays, de Kalverstraat, has
een one of the main shopping streets for almost 300 years. Note that
e identify these effects within shopping streets and control for the cur-
ent location of cinemas, hence our instrument plausibly addresses the
arious endogeneity concerns. 
We also make sure that our results do not depend on this particu-
ar choice of instruments by going back even further in time. We will
se the number of shops in 1832 as an instrument. This instrument is
articularly convincing because we show, using data on land values in
832, that past attractive locations do not command higher retail rents
owadays. We are able to show that the location of shops in 1832 is
 strong instrument (for footfall and number of shops), even when we
ontrol for the number of buildings in 1832. We discuss the assumptions
nderlying our identification strategy at length in the paper. 
Our results show that footfall and number of shops have a strong
ositive effect on rental income with an elasticity ranging from 0.25–9 Shopping streets tend to be short; in our data, the median length is only 
82 m. 
10 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for mentioning the latter two 
easons. 

















































































































12 As an alternative, one may estimate the effect on transaction prices of shops. 
There are two reasons we prefer to focus on rental income. First, transaction 
prices reflect expectations about future rents and therefore future levels of shop- 
ping externalities. Second, sales transactions are rare relative to rent transac- 
tions. In our data, only 10% of the observations refer to sales transactions. 
13 This assumption is made for convenience only, as it is plausible that shoppers .50. When instrumenting, the estimates for both footfall and number of
hops are somewhat higher. Thus, there are substantial external benefits
rom fostering footfall and retail concentration. 
Based on these estimates, the optimal level of subsidy to store owners
ppears to be substantial, which potentially justifies a range of current
olicies that are especially beneficial to shopping streets. Current poli-
ies either subsidise shop owners, e.g. through pedestrianisation of pop-
lar shopping streets, or subsidise shoppers either through the provision
f (subsidised, and sometimes even free) public transport to shopping
istricts or parking. Zoning policies which concentrates shopping into
hopping streets ( e.g. at the expense of residential housing), may also be
eneficial. 
Related literature. Our paper links and contributes to three strands
f literature. First, it relates to the literature on spatial competition
nd product differentiation ( D’Aspremont et al., 1979; Osborne and
itchik, 1987 ). Davis (2006) focuses on movie theatres, and evaluates
onsumers’ transport costs, the effect of geographic differentiation, and
he extent of market power. Seim (2006) shows that there are significant
eturns to product (or spatial) differentiation and illustrates that markets
ith more scope for differentiation support greater entry. Jia (2008) and
rcidiacono et al. (2016) study the impact of Wal-Mart on the retail
arket on incumbent (discount) supermarkets and small grocery stores.
lapp et al. (2016) focus on openings and closings of multi-line de-
artment stores and find evidence for strong negative competitive ef-
ects within the own branch. Zhou (2014) shows that multi-product
earch, which is important when consumers buy multiple products in
ne shopping trip, can significantly influence retail firms’ pricing de-
isions. Johansen and Nilssen (2016) investigate the conditions under
hich one-stop shopping causes the formation of big stores. However,
hese papers ignore that many shops benefit from each other when lo-
ated close to each other. 
Our paper also relates to a second literature that explicitly focuses
n the benefits of agglomeration for firms. There is ample evidence that
rms that locate close together benefit through input- and output shar-
ng, labour market pooling and knowledge spillovers ( Marshall, 1890 ).
urrent evidence suggests that the elasticity of productivity with re-
pect to density is around 0.05 (see e.g. the meta-analysis by Melo et al.,
009 ). This literature typically focuses on the manufacturing indus-
ry. Compared to that literature, we find substantial agglomeration
lasticities, which are (at least) 5 times larger. This is in line with
oster et al. (2014) , who show that agglomeration economies are much
ore important for retail firms. Teulings et al. (2017) use a monocen-
ric model where customers arrive in a central location and have to walk
o shops around this location. Locations that are further away from the
entre are therefore expected to be less profitable. Their empirical evi-
ence indicates that rents in shopping districts are indeed higher close
o the centre. 11 
Our findings also contribute to a more policy-oriented literature
tudying the effectiveness of retail policies, in particular towards the
ffects of the opening of large ‘big-box’ retailers near the urban fringe
 Sanchez-Vidal, 2016 ). Some studies demonstrate that the welfare ef-
ects of current planning policies that hinder entry in retail markets, and
articularly of large retailers, are negative. Several studies have shown
hat regulation policies reduce retail productivity and job growth and in-
rease market power of incumbent stores ( Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002;
chivardi and Viviano, 2011; Haskel and Sadun, 2012; Cheshire et al.,
015 ). By contrast, our study shows that current policies that implic-
tly subsidise store owners in shopping streets are potentially welfare
mproving, as they make it more attractive to open additional stores in
ense areas. This conclusion is consistent with the shopping mall litera-
ure, which shows that the provision of substantial rent discounts to ‘an-
hor’ stores in US shopping malls to internalise externalities is common11 To capture this phenomenon, we control for walking time to the centre of a 





ractice ( Pashigian and Gould, 1998; Gould et al., 2005 ). Shopping ex-
ernalities may justify public policies that pedestrianise shopping streets
n order to effectively cluster shops and internalise external benefits. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
iscuss the theoretical framework that guides the empirical results.
ection 3 introduces the data and reports descriptive statistics, followed
y a discussion of the econometric framework in Section 4 . In Section 5 ,
e present and discuss our results, including the estimates of the op-
imal subsidy. Section 6 discusses an extension where we allow for a
eterogeneous version of our model. Also the main sensitivity analyses
re discussed. The latter are described in more detail in Appendix D. We
raw conclusions in Section 7 . 
. Theoretical framework 
.1. Rental income, rents and vacancies 
We aim to measure the presence of shopping externalities by esti-
ating the effect of footfall or number of shops on (expected) rental
ncome of shop i , denoted by I i . 
12 Footfall is defined as the number of
edestrians that pass a shop (per unit of time). We assume that pedestri-
ns walk through one shopping street and pass all shops in this street. 13 
et 𝑠 = { 𝑓, 𝑁} denote shopping externalities, where f refers to footfall
nd N to the number of shops in the shopping street. 14 In what follows,
e make a distinction between store owners that own shops and retail
rms that rent shops. Shops can be either occupied by retail firms or
acant. Store owners of vacant shops need advertising services to find
 new tenant, which is costly. Given rent p i and vacancy rate v , rental
ncome of a shop is given by: 
 𝑖 = 𝑝 𝑖 (1 − 𝑣 ) − 𝑐 𝑖 𝑣, (1)
here 𝑝 𝑖 (1 − 𝑣 ) is rental income when the property is let to a retail firm
nd c i v is the advertising costs. It seems reasonable to assume that, at
east in the long run, the advertising costs c i are proportional to p i , so
 𝑖 = 𝜅𝑝 𝑖 , where 𝜅 > 0. Because vacancy rates tend to be small (usually
maller than 10% in our data), log (1 − (1 + 𝜅) 𝑣 ) ≈ −(1 + 𝜅) 𝑣 . Hence, the
og of rental income is then (approximately) equal to log 𝑝 𝑖 − (1 + 𝜅) 𝑣 . 
If shopping externalities have an effect on the rent and vacancy rate,
t follows that the effect of log shopping externalities on log rental in-
ome can be written as the sum of the marginal effect of log shopping
xternalities on the logarithm of rent and the marginal effect of log shop-
ing externalities on the level of the vacancy rate: 
𝜕 log 𝐼 𝑖 
𝜕 log 𝑠 
≈
𝜕 log 𝑝 𝑖 
𝜕 log 𝑠 
− (1 + 𝜅) 𝜕𝑣 
𝜕 log 𝑠 
. (2)
Note that a standard hedonic model cannot be used to predict
 log I i / 𝜕 log s because vacancies are not incorporated in such a frame-
ork. In Appendix A.1 we therefore set up a search and bargaining
ramework, where store owners have to decide on the level of advertis-
ng which is necessary to find retail firms searching for retail space. Con-
equently, in this set up, vacancy rates are endogenously determined.
urthermore, it is assumed that owners with vacant properties and retail
rms searching for retail space bargain about the rent level when they
ake contact with each other, while both are uncertain how much time
t takes to make another contact. We then show that, in equilibrium,sually walk through several shopping streets. 
14 In our empirical application, we take into account that shoppers usually 
alk through several shopping streets. We will measure N based on the number 
f shops within a given radius of a shop. The area defined by this radius may 
nclude several shopping streets. 



































































































 log p i / 𝜕 log s > 0 and 𝜕 v / 𝜕 log s < 0. 
15 Hence, in equilibrium, shopping
xternalities not only increase rents, but also increase vacancy rates. If
e assume that 𝜅 = 0 , we get the lower bound estimate of the effect of
ootfall on log rental income. We will make that assumption but also
alculate the effect of footfall on rental income for different values of 𝜅
based on the advertising costs for Dutch retail properties). 
.2. Welfare and retail policies 
Let us now focus on welfare effects of retail policies. Intuition sug-
ests that retail policy can be welfare improving, because retail firms
enerate footfall, and policies may influence the spatial concentration
f retail films. To investigate this, we will assume here that the effect
f shopping externalities is entirely driven by the effect of footfall on
ental income. The effect of number of shops is only indirect, as it af-
ects footfall, but not rental income directly. Hence, more formally, we
ssume that for a shop i the rental income is: 
 𝑖 ( 𝑓, 𝑁) = 𝐼 𝑖 ( 𝑓 ( 𝑁)) = 𝑝 𝑖 ( 𝑓 ( 𝑁))(1 − 𝑣 ( 𝑓 ( 𝑁))) − 𝑐 𝑖 𝑣 ( 𝑓 ( 𝑁)) . (3)
tore owners may decide to increase the supply of stores in a street (ex-
ensive margin) or/and reduce existing vacancies (intensive margin). 16 
ence, the number of shops, as well as the number of vacant shops in a
hopping street, is endogenous. Both decisions imply an externality be-
ause footfall depends positively on the number of shops and negatively
n the vacancy rate. Here we investigate the welfare effect of increasing
he number of occupied shops. 17 Combined with the assumption that we
ocus on a competitive market, this implies that it is not necessary to
istinguish between shop owners and retail firms. 
The number of occupied shops, N , in a shopping street is endoge-
ously determined. For now let us assume that shops are homogeneous.
he per-period marginal construction and maintenance costs of N shops
re equal to C ( N ), which is increasing in N . Footfall in a street, f , is an
ncreasing function of the number of shops in the shopping street, so
 f / 𝜕 N > 0, as well as the footfall generated per individual shop , denoted
y 𝑓 𝑖 , so 𝜕 𝑓∕ 𝜕 𝑓 𝑖 > 0 . The shop’s costs of generating footfall are equal to
 𝑖 ( 𝑓 𝑖 ) , which is an increasing and convex function of 𝑓 𝑖 . For example,
hops may generate footfall by advertising, which is costly. Welfare in
he shopping street is now defined by: 
𝑁 
0 
𝐼 𝑖 ( 𝑓 ( 𝑁, 𝑓 𝑖 ))d 𝑖 − 𝐶( 𝑁) − ∫
𝑁 
0 
𝑞 𝑖 ( 𝑓 𝑖 )d 𝑖. (4)
he welfare-optimal number of shops is then determined by the follow-
ng equation: 
 𝑖 + 𝑁 
𝜕𝐼 𝑖 = 𝐶 ′( 𝑁) + 𝑞 𝑖 ( 𝑓 𝑖 ) , (5)
𝜕𝑁 
15 Another issue is that footfall depends on the number of vacancies, as vacant 
hops will attract fewer customers. We address this issue in Appendix A.2 where 
e endogenise footfall so that it is dependent on vacancy rates. We show that 
he main consequence of ignoring this endogenous relationship for our empirical 
nvestigation is that one underestimates the effect of footfall on rental income. 
e come back to this issue in Section 4 . 
16 The supply of shops can be increased by building new properties for retail 
ctivity or by converting existing space to retail use. Existing vacancies may be 
educed e.g. by increasing the search effort. 
17 The welfare effect of filling an existing vacancy and increasing the supply of 
hops is equivalent given two conditions. The first is that filling an vacancy and 
ncreasing the supply of shops has an identical effect on footfall, which seems 
easonable. The second condition is that, in the absence of a footfall externality, 
he decision to fill a vacancy is socially optimal, implying that there are no other 
xternalities. Note that store owners with vacancies may increase their advertis- 
ng expenditure, which increases the probability to find a tenant. That, in turn, 
ay increase footfall for other shops. It is in general not clear whether store 
wners with vacancies choose the socially optimal advertising expenditure be- 
ause of negative congestion and positive search externalities. See, for example, 
osios (1990) for an analysis of optimal advertising expenditure in the labour 


















here 𝑖 = 𝑁 . The above equation states that the marginal expected in-
ome of N is equal to the sum of the marginal cost of opening an addi-
ional store and the cost of generating footfall. Note that the marginal
enefit of opening a shop – i.e. the left-hand side of the above equation
is an increasing function of N . This is intuitive, because each shop that
pens up in the shopping street benefits from the footfall generated by
earby retail firms. This implies that the cost of opening a shop ( C ( N ))
ust be strongly convex, so that the second-order condition holds. 18 
To calculate the optimal subsidy to store owners is straightforward.
he marginal store owner will ignore the term N ( 𝜕 I i / 𝜕 N ) when consid-
ring to increase (or decrease) the supply of shops. Hence, the marginal




= 𝐼 𝑖 ⋅ 𝜀 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 ) > 0 , (6)
here 𝜀 I,N ( i ) denotes the elasticity of rental income of shop i with respect
o the number of shops. In our empirical application we will estimate
he elasticity 𝜀 I,N ( i ). 
Importantly, we will assume that this shopping externality is not
nternalised by store owners. This seems a reasonable assumption for
hopping streets due to the fragmented ownership of shops, which is,
s we will show, supported by our data. 19 Given this assumption, the
igouvian subsidy to the marginal store owner in the first-best optimum
s 𝜀 I,N ( i ) times the rental income of a shop. In our empirical analysis, we
re able to calculate this subsidy as we will observe rental income and
stimate 𝜀 I,N ( i ). 
We will now determine the welfare-optimal level of footfall in a
treet, which is the result of the self-chosen footfall level by an individual
rm. The welfare-optimal level at the street level, f , can then be derived
y maximising welfare with respect to the individual level of footfall,
 ̃𝑖 . It can be derived by an equation, which states that the marginal ex-




𝜕 𝑓 𝑖 
= 𝑞 ′
𝑖 
( 𝑓 𝑖 ) . (7)
e will now assume that shops are homogeneous. This implies that 𝑓 𝑖 =
 ̃, 𝐼 𝑖 = 𝐼, 𝑞 𝑖 ( 𝑓 𝑖 ) = 𝑞( 𝑓 ) and 𝜀 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 ) = 𝜀 𝐼,𝑁 . It follows that 𝑓 = 𝑁 𝑓 and
q. (7) can be written as: 
𝜕𝐼 
𝜕𝑓 
𝑁 = 𝑞 ′( 𝑓 ) . (8)
he left-hand side of this equation depicts the marginal benefit of foot-
all to society generated by an individual shop. The marginal benefit of
ootfall to a shop is equal to 𝜕 I / 𝜕 f (as the shop ignores that other shops
n the same street benefit from the footfall). Given that the number of
hops is usually large in a street (and far above one), the external benefit
f footfall, and hence the welfare-optimal subsidy, is equal to: 20 
𝜕𝐼 
𝜕𝑓 
𝑁 = 𝑁 ⋅ 𝐼 
𝑓 
𝜀 𝐼,𝑓 > 0 , (9)18 The latter is likely true because in shopping streets, shops almost always 
ccupy the ground floor of a building (see Liu et al., 2016 ), which implies that 
he number of shops is restricted by the length of the street. 
19 In contrast, in shopping malls, developers will internalise these externalities 
y determining the optimal number of stores and by charging lower rents to 
ootfall-generating shops (or ‘anchor stores’) ( Brueckner, 1993; Pashigian and 
ould, 1998; Konishi and Sandfort, 2003 ) Therefore, in a shopping mall, the 
eveloper is able to provide first-best subsidies, based on the amount of footfall 
enerated by each store, and maximize a shopping mall’s welfare. 
20 To evaluate the exact general-equilibrium welfare improvements associated 
ith such a subsidy is out of the scope of the current paper and depends on, 
mong others, to what extent such a policy leads to openings of new retail firms 
n the economy, and to what extent existing shops move to other shopping streets 
ue to the subsidy. If the demand for street shopping is inelastic, then the welfare 
ains will mainly come from travel cost savings. If it is elastic, then the welfare 
ains will be higher. Eq. (6) does not make clear whether shops in shopping 
treets with many shops nearby should receive higher levels of subsidies than 
hops in streets with few shops. Hence let us analyse the difference in optimal 
ubsidy level between two shopping streets, labelled 1 and 2, which can be 

















































































































here 𝜀 I,f denotes the elasticity of rental income with respect to footfall.
n our empirical application we will also estimate the elasticity 𝜀 I,f . We
ill show that in our data 𝜀 𝐼,𝑓 = 𝜀 𝐼,𝑁 (which is in line with our assump-
ion that footfall is proportional to the number of shops in the street). 
We previously assumed that retail firms are homogeneous. It is clear
owever that retail firms may differ in the extent that they benefit from
he presence of other shops, i.e. footfall. Hence, we will allow 𝜀 I,N and
 I,f to be retail firm-specific. We will see however that heterogeneity
f retail firms with respect to the marginal willingness to pay for foot-
all generated by other shops is quite limited in shopping streets, which
uggests that modern shopping streets attract relatively similar shops.
n Section 6 we will investigate this further. 
. Data and descriptives 
.1. Data 
We base our empirical analysis on various datasets. The first one is
btained from Strabo , a consultancy firm that gathers commercial prop-
rty data. It comprises transactions of commercial properties provided
y real estate agents from 2003 to 2015. The dataset contains infor-
ation about annual rents (reported at the moment that the contract
as been signed) and rental property attributes, such as address, size
gross floor area in m 2 ) and whether the building is newly constructed
r renovated. In our data, all rents are independent of retail revenues
n line with common practice for the Netherlands. 21 From the Strabo
ataset, we exclude observations for which no rent is reported (27.8%
f all shops in the dataset). 22 The rental transactions are then matched to
ata from the Building Registry (BAG), which provides the exact location
nd construction year for all buildings in the Netherlands. Using a 25 m
istance threshold, we matched almost all of the Strabo shops. Based
n the Listed Building Register , we have added information on whether
he rental property is in an area that is assigned as a historic district.
he latter is relevant since historic districts may attract tourists that are
ot interested in shopping ( Carlino and Saiz, 2008 ). The dataset is also
erged with detailed land use data from Statistics Netherlands . The latter
ata enable the calculation of distance to the nearest railway station.
o determine amenities and accessibility of the shop, we first gather
ata from Duo on the locations of kindergartens, primary and secondary
chools in the street. From Imergis we use the location of public build-
ngs (town halls, police and fire stations) and religious buildings. Using
penStreetMap we also determine the number of bus stops in a shop-
ing street. It is hard to control for all relevant amenities. We therefore
ather data from Eric Fisher’s Geotagger’s World Atlas , which contain all
he geocoded pictures on the website Flickr . These pictures should be a
easonable proxy for a location’s attractiveness (see Gaigné et al., 2018 ).
The other main dataset is a retail dataset obtained from Locatus ,
hich contains the entire population of shops. For each establishment,
e know whether a shop is vacant or occupied and its retail sector (when
ccupied), and whether a retail firm occupying a shop is part of a chain.
urthermore, we know the 8-digit retail sector, which provides very de-
ailed information. For example, we do not only know whether a retail
rm sells apparel, but also whether it targeted at kids, women or men. ritten as 𝐼 1 ⋅ 𝜀 1 
𝐼,𝑁 
− 𝐼 2 ⋅ 𝜀 2 
𝐼,𝑁 
. Now suppose that street 1 contains more shops 
han street 2. This equation shows that larger shopping streets must receive 
arger subsidies as long as the elasticity of rental income with respect to number 
f shops is positive (implying I 1 > I 0 ) and non-decreasing in the number of shops 
so, 𝜀 1 
𝐼,𝑁 
≥ 𝜀 2 
𝐼,𝑁 
). We will see that both conditions are fulfilled. This implies that 
ubsidies to store owners in large shopping streets must exceed those in small 
hopping streets. 
21 Moreover, our identification strategy will address the issue of ‘percent rents’. 
22 We do not find evidence for differences between the transactions with and 
ithout information on rents, although the latter seem to refer to somewhat 











a  The Locatus dataset also provides 3936 annual counts of footfall in
ll main shopping streets of the Netherlands from 2003 to 2015, so that
e have more than 50 thousand footfall counts over the whole study pe-
iod. The measurement points are not the shops themselves, but selected
oints in pedestrian streets or at sidewalks with an average distance of
5 m between them. The main shopping streets contain about 13.4%
f all shops in the Netherlands. The annual footfall data, provided by
ocatus , is based on footfall measurements collected on four ‘regular’
aturdays (two in Spring and two in Autumn) at four different hours
f the day. Using these 16 measurements, Locatus calculates the aver-
ge footfall per day. The footfall data are matched to all shops in the
reviously-defined shopping streets. Within each shopping street, the
verage distance between footfall measures is approximately 45 m. 
For most observations (about 90%) in the Strabo dataset we have
etailed information on the name of the retail firm renting the store.
e have matched each rent transaction in the Strabo dataset to a shop
n the Locatus dataset in order to recover the 8-digit sector and whether
he firm is part of a chain. 
We have defined a shopping street as a continuous straight street
or slightly curved street) based on manually created GIS polylines for
ll streets for which there is at least one location where footfall data is
vailable. Using this definition, based on the above-discussed Building
egistry dataset, we define 1253 unique shopping streets. The median
ength of these streets is 182 m, so streets are short. The median width
f a street is 12 m. This underlines that we focus on shopping streets
ithin European cities with short and narrow streets, rather than, for
xample, U.S. cities, which usually have longer and wider streets. 
We illustrate the data in Fig. 1 based on a sample of our data for
he city centre of Amsterdam, which contains two shopping districts
ncluding the city centre. This area is the busiest shopping district of the
etherlands with the highest level of daily footfall. It shows that there
s substantial spatial variation in the annual average of footfall both
ithin shopping streets and between shopping districts. Moreover, rent
ransactions (the stars in the map) are numerous and cover almost the
hole shopping district. The centre of shopping districts is determined
y taking the location with the highest footfall within the district. 
For our identification strategy, explained later on, we will also rely
n historic data going back to 1930 or even 1832. We gathered infor-
ation on the exact location of cinemas in 1930, as well as in 2010
in 1930 there were 315 cinemas, while in 2010 this has been reduced
o 180) from SpinLab . For maps and descriptive statistics, we refer the
eader to Appendix B.1 . 
We further use data from HISGIS , which provides geocoded data
f the first Dutch census of 1830. It is the oldest nationwide regis-
ration system of property and land ownership. We have information
n the footprint size of each building. Moreover, for each parcel we
now the owner and the owner’s occupation. Based on the occupation
nd whether there was a building located on the parcel, we determine
hether a building was used as a shop. We explain this in more de-
ail in Appendix B.1 . For each parcel we also have information on the
o-called Cadastral Income , which is a proxy for the land value, as land
axes were based on this value. Again, we report descriptives and maps
n Appendix B.1 . 
.2. Descriptives 
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics for the main vari-
bles that we include in our analysis. Our main dependent variable is
he annual rental price. Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics
or the Strabo dataset. We have 4738 rental transactions located in 131
hopping districts. The mean rental price is equal to € 51,449. Footfall
xhibits substantial variation ranging from 100 to 71,000 pedestrians
assing by each day. Mean daily footfall is 13,328 with a standard de-
iation of 8935. 
In the theoretical analysis, we focused on the number of shops within
 shopping street. Nonetheless, we want to take into account shoppers
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Fig. 1. Sample map for the Amsterdam city centre. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the Strabo dataset. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
mean sd min max 
Rent (in €) 51,234 83,227 3400 2,700,000 
Footfall (number of shoppers per day) 13,328 8935 100 71,000 
Number of shops, < 200 m 132.2 68.89 0 406 
In pedestrianised street 0.862 0.345 0 1 
Size of property (in m 2 ) 201.2 268.2 19 7200 
Building – new 0.0112 0.105 0 1 
Building – renovated 0.00708 0.0839 0 1 
Construction year 1933 85.30 1325 2016 
In historic district 0.474 0.499 0 1 
Number of photos in street, < 200 m 283.4 451.3 0 5181 
Religious buildings in street, < 200 m 0.714 1.058 0 6 
Bus stops in street, < 200 m 0.861 1.478 0 10 
Public buildings in street, < 200 m 0.0955 0.302 0 2 
Schools, kindergartens in street, < 200 m 0.153 0.515 0 4 
Railway stations, < 200 m 0.0247 0.155 0 1 






































23 The Strabo dataset contains a considerably higher share of shops in older 
buildings (particularly constructed before 1940) than the Locatus dataset, which 
contains the full population (the main explanation for this difference is that 
the Strabo dataset is based on rental transactions. Therefore, it is not a random 
sample of the population of shops, because owned shops are excluded and shops 
with long rental contracts are under-represented). ho walk through several streets. Therefore, we will measure the num-
er of shops within a radius of 200 m from each shop location (but we
ill also experiment with other thresholds). The area defined by a 200 m
adius may contain several shopping streets. There are on average 132
hops within 200 m, hence the number of shops within the vicinity is
ery high. Moreover, the large majority of shops are small, with a mean
f 201 m 2 . One implication of this is that individual shops usually con-
ribute little to overall footfall, which makes it very unlikely that shop
wners within shopping streets have market power and suggests that
he retail real estate market is highly competitive. 
The correlation between footfall and number of shops in the vicinity
s moderate ( 𝜌 = 0 . 375 ). About 1% of shops are either new or renovatedhen the rental transaction took place. About 6% of the shops is built
efore 1832, while about half of the shops are built before the Second
orld War. Therefore, almost half of the observations is in historic dis-
ricts. In Table 1 we also provide information about pedestrian streets.
e do not control for pedestrian streets in the analysis (pedestrianisa-
ion might be endogenous), but note that the large majority of shops,
bout 85%, are located in streets that are pedestrianised. 
In our data, we will distinguish between 153 shopping districts (a
hopping district contains about 260 shops, on average). A substantial
roportion of shopping districts (about 45%) are not within 5 km of
he centre of a city. Hence, in terms of shopping districts, we have a
ood representation of shopping districts that are out of the city centre.
owever, the proportion of shops not within 5 km of the centre of a city
s much smaller and only about 25% (as suburban shopping districts
end to be smaller). 
In Table 2 , we report descriptive statistics for shops in the Locatus
ataset. We have 410,544 observations of shops in 133 shopping dis-
ricts and 1243 shopping streets. About 6% of the shops are vacant. 23 
he descriptive statistics of the location variables are comparable to the
escriptive statistics for the Locatus data. 
We focus on shops in shopping streets that presumably aim to benefit
rom footfall, hence our sample of shops is far from a random sample
f shops. This is particularly the case for clothing. Clothing stores are
he most common branch (30% of shops) – almost 4 times higher than
he national average. However, this is not the case for restaurants and
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the Locatus dataset. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
mean sd min max 
Shop is vacant 0.0610 0.239 0 1 
Footfall (number of shoppers per day) 12,379 10,732 100 102,600 
Number of shops, < 200 m 129.0 62.77 0 439 
In pedestrianised street 0.843 0.364 0 1 
Building size (in m 2 ) 179.9 1089 25 27,694 
Construction year 1967 35.83 1445 2012 
In historic district 0.403 0.490 0 1 
Number of photos in street, < 200 m 280.5 560.7 0 5493 
Religious buildings in street, < 200 m 0.755 1.096 0 7 
Bus stops in street, < 200 m 0.705 1.338 0 10 
Public buildings in street, < 200 m 0.0951 0.301 0 2 
Schools, kindergartens in street, < 200 m 0.185 0.552 0 4 
Railway stations, < 200 m 0.0193 0.138 0 1 
































































































25 Since the probability that a shopper is included in our measure of footfall 
is (approximately) proportional to the number of shops visited, the share of 
non-shoppers or one-stop shoppers should be much smaller than the share of 
multi-stop shoppers. For example, if 25% of footfall were one-stop shoppers, 
and the other 75% visit four shops, then the proportion of one-stop shoppers afés: the share of restaurants and cafés (16%) is exactly equal to the
ational average. In both branches the degree of product differentiation
s extremely high. 
In Europe, shopping districts usually exhibit a pattern of mixed land
ses. This is also the case in the Netherlands. Using information from the
uilding Registry on buildings within 25 m of a shopping street, it appears
hat a small minority, only about one quarter, of the properties is used
or shopping, whereas almost half of the properties is residential, and
he other quarter is used for other purposes ( e.g. offices, public services).
The observation that shops are typically small suggests that the re-
ail real estate market is highly competitive, but this is only true when
tore ownership (and therefore land ownership) within shopping streets
s highly fragmented. This appears to be the case. This claim is based
n the Strabo dataset for which store owner type and regularly even
wner’s name is reported (we know the store owner type for about two
hirds of the observations and store owner’s name for about one third
f the observations). Using information about names, it appears that on
verage only 28% of the shops within a shopping street belong to a store
wner who owns more than one shop in the same shopping street. 24 On
verage, store owners possess 1.32 shops per street, which is a low num-
er given that there are on average 55 shops per street. This indicates
hat it is highly unlikely that the shopping externality that we measure
s internalised. 
We also use information about owner type that distinguishes be-
ween private-store owners, real estate agencies, pension funds, con-
truction companies etc. Only 34% of shops are owned by real estate
nvestors. Thus, the large majority of shops are owned by individual
rivate investors, which further supports our claim that ownership of
hops within shopping streets is highly fragmented. We also gathered in-
ormation from Menger (2014) on localised shop associations, in which
xternalities may be internalised (but which may not engage in anti-
ompetitive activities). These shop associations are area-based and or-
anise e.g. collective marketing and provide public goods such as Christ-
as lightning. On average 14% of the retail firms are part of such asso-
iations. 
. Econometric framework 
.1. Rents 
We first focus on the estimation of the effect of shopping externalities
n rents of retail establishments. Let p ijt be the rent paid by retail firm i
n shopping street j in year t . We use two proxies for shopping external-24 Given that this dataset only contains rental transactions, it is likely that the 
hare of multi-store owners is overrepresented in our sample, because this share 





ties 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = { 𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑁 𝑖𝑗𝑡 } : footfall and the number of shops in the vicinity.
urthermore, let x ijt be other shop and location characteristics ( e.g. shop
ize, construction year, historic district etc.). The basic equation to be
stimated yields: 
og 𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (10)
here 𝛼 and 𝛽 are parameters to be estimated, 𝜃t are year fixed effects
nd 𝜖ijt is a random error term. 
There are a number of concerns when using footfall as a proxy for
hopping externalities. One may be worried that non-shoppers and one-
top shoppers may be included in footfall. Arguably, this is a minor issue
ecause our measure of footfall predominantly includes shoppers who
isit several shops. 25 
Another concern is measurement error. Measurement error is likely
resent for a range of reasons. First, for footfall, we only have measures
n specific Saturdays, which may not be representative for the average
aturday, or for other days of the week. We believe that the extent of
easurement error here is not too serious. Second, the number of shops
n the vicinity may have substantial measurement error, because shops
iffer substantially in size. In specifications with street fixed effects, the
ias caused by measurement error within the same street may become
ore pronounced. Most likely, we will get underestimates because of
easurement error. To take measurement error into account, we will
se an IV approach, as explained later on. 
A more serious concern is potential simultaneity. Rents of shops may
etermine the type of shop, whereas shops vary in the extent of footfall
hey generate; hence there is potentially an effect of rents on footfall.
urthermore, the level of rent may determine the size of shops and there-
ore, the number of shops in vicinity. Hence, the number of shops may
lso be endogenous. Moreover, there may be unobserved store and loca-
ion characteristics that are correlated with footfall and the number of
hops in the vicinity. For example, a store’s building quality may be im-
ortant for profits. When building quality is non-randomly distributed
ver space ( e.g. nicer buildings in areas with more footfall and shops)
nd customers value building quality, a naïve hedonic regression would
uffer from omitted variable bias. 
To make the identification of a causal effect of shopping externalities
ore plausible, we take a number of steps. First, we include shopping
istrict fixed effects, implying that we identify the differences in foot-
all within the shopping district. This approach mitigates the problem
f unobserved endowments, but may not solve the problem entirely be-
ause shopping districts may be quite large. We therefore also propose
nother identification strategy using spatial variation in local footfall
ithin shopping streets. We will also control for web-scraped data on
ictures taken by residents and tourists and count the number of pictures
n each shopping street. The idea is that locations with an abundant sup-
ly of aesthetic amenities may have a high picture density and a high
umber of non-shoppers or one-stop shoppers. 26 
Second, to mitigate the issue that specific retail firms that generate
 lot of footfall may negotiate lower rents, we use information on the
-digit retail sector and whether the retail firm is part of a chain. 𝜓 i ∈ k is
hen a fixed effect for each retail sector by chain combination, denoted
y k . We then estimate: 
og 𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑗 + 𝜓 𝑖 ∈𝑘 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (11)ould be only 7.8%. 
26 Ahlfeldt (2016) and Gaigné et al. (2018) show that there is a strong positive 
orrelation between picture density and amenities, such as historic buildings, 
estaurants and parks. The number of pictures in a street is likely a good proxy 
or foot traffic that is not necessarily related to shopping. 














































































































t  here 𝜑 j are shopping street fixed effects. 
We improve on this specification by estimating specifications where
i) we include retail firm fixed effects to further control for unobserved
etail firm characteristics, (ii) only focus on small shops, where it is
nlikely that the retail firm will contribute substantially to footfall, and
iii) focus on firms that are not part of a larger retail chain, which are
ore likely to advertise and therefore to generate footfall. We also show
hat (iv) when flexibly controlling for the walking time to the city centre,
he results are essentially unaffected. 
Still, one may not be fully convinced that Eq. (11) fully addresses the
ssue of unobserved store and locational characteristics. Furthermore, it
s plausible that reverse causation still plays a role. 
In order to address such concerns, we will also pursue an instru-
ental variables strategy. We will use locally long-lagged instruments,
hich do not affect directly today’s rents, but determine contemporary
oncentration of shops and, therefore, footfall. More specifically, condi-
ional on shopping street fixed effects, we will first use the number of
inemas in 1930 in the vicinity as an instrument for the current number
f shops in the vicinity and footfall. 
We use cinemas in 1930 as a proxy for historic shops, because we do
ot have historic data on the location of shops. Historic shops would be
 preferred instrument, because one may argue that changing historical
uildings for different use ( e.g. from retail into residential or the other
ay around) is a costly process and requires changing zoning plans. As a
esult, current retail outlets tend to be located in buildings where retail
as 1930 even within the same street . 
Historically, most cinemas were small, with one screen only, and
ere located in shopping streets (those who have survived tend to be
elatively large). The buildings containing such cinemas are not very
ifferent from the surrounding buildings typically used for shops. One
ay be concerned that cinemas themselves create footfall, while this
oes not necessarily imply shopping externalities (as people may only
isit the cinema and not visit other shops). Hence, we control for the
umber of cinemas in the vicinity in 2010. 27 The buildings of the closed
inemas nowadays are frequently used as shops, but also attract other
usinesses. 
The main identifying assumption when relying on long-lagged in-
truments is that past unobservable characteristics of either stores or
ocations are uncorrelated to current unobservables (which affect de-
and). This assumption is often criticised because the locations of cities
re determined long ago, e.g. due to natural advantages. However, we
dentify the effect within shopping streets, making the identifying as-
umption more credible. 28 The most obvious threat to identification is
hat past building and location quality are correlated to shopping exter-
alities. We therefore control for construction period dummies including
 dummy whether the shops has been built before 1930. We also include
 dummy indicating whether the property is in a historic district to con-
rol for the quality of (historic) buildings in the surroundings. 
We also construct an alternative instrument based on data of the ex-
ct locations of all buildings in 1832, which is available for about 50%
f our data. Based on occupational census of land owners, we determine
hether a certain building was a shop. We then calculate the number
f shops in 1832 in the vicinity. The census from 1832 also provides
nformation on the so-called Cadastral Income , which was a tax based
n the assessed value of each parcel of the building and the surround-27 In the shopping streets we focus on, there are currently 180 cinemas, but 
n 1930 there were about 60% more (315 cinemas). We control for current cin- 
mas, so variation in cinemas comes from the presence of closed, and likely 
maller, cinemas. 
28 Gaigné et al. (2018) argue that for Dutch cities, the amenity distribution 
ithin cities has considerably changed. For example, around the 1930s, open 
ater and densely built-up areas were not necessarily considered amenities. It 
as also before the time when cars became the dominant mode of transport. 
eople usually walked to their working place, and thus commuting distances 







i  ng land. We will therefore control for the value of land in 1832, which
hould address the issue that past unobservables are correlated to cur-
ent unobservables. To further control for the fact that a location is in
 historically denser part of the street ( e.g. closer to the city centre), we
ontrol for the number of buildings in 1832 in the vicinity. 
Hence, our identification strategy exploits that there is a reasonably
trong autocorrelation of shop locations over time. This autocorrelation
f retail locations is also in line with anecdotal evidence. For example,
msterdam’s current main shopping street, the Kalverstraat, has been an
mportant shopping street for more than 300 years. 29 We emphasise here
hat the unobserved factors which make shop locations attractive now,
re likely very different from the (economic) forces which induced shops
o settle at certain locations historically: up to a hundred years ago,
hoppers walked to these streets, and shop workers, who were also shop
wners, frequently lived above their shops. Nowadays, due to changes
n transport technology, shoppers do not walk to the shopping street
but only within), whereas shop workers, who are employees and not
hop owners any more, come from far away using modern transport
echnologies (motor vehicles, public transport, bicycle). 
The first stage of our estimation procedure entails: 
og 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿 log 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ̃𝛾ℎ 𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑 𝑗 + ?̃? 𝑖 ∈𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (12)
here the ∼ refer to first-stage coefficients, z ij is either the number
f cinemas in 1930 or the number of shops in 1832 in the vicinity. h ij 
re control variables related to the historic instruments ( e.g. number of
inemas in 2010, Cadastral Income in 1832). The second-stage is given
y: 
og 𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 log ̂𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾ℎ 𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑 𝑗 + 𝜓 𝑖 ∈𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (13)
here log ̂𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = { log 𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡 , log ?̂? 𝑖𝑗𝑡 } represents the predicted footfall or
umber of shops from the first stage. 
.2. Vacancies 
We will also estimate the effect of log footfal as well as the log num-
er of shops in the vicinity, on whether the shop is vacant, indicated by
he dummy variable v ijt . Once again, we will use shopping street fixed
ffects and exploit the variation in footfall and the probability to be
acant within shopping streets. For the same reasons that footfall may
e endogenous with respect to rent, it is possible that footfall is endoge-
ous with respect of vacancies. Furthermore, there may be a direct form
f reverse causation, because one expects footfall to decrease when va-
ancies increase. We will use again long-lagged historic instruments to
eal with endogeneity issues, as it is impossible that current vacancies
irectly impact the number of cinemas in 1930 or the number of shops
n 1832. 
. Results 
The results section is structured as follows. We first discuss the effects
f footfall and the number of shops in the shopping street on rents. In
he second part, we focus on the effects of footfall and the number of
hops on the probability of a shop to be vacant. We take these results
ogether to estimate the effects of footfall and number of shops on rental
ncome. We close this section by discussing the welfare implications and
eriving the Pigouvian subsidy. 
.1. Shopping externalities and rents 
Table 3 reports the results of our baseline regressions. The specifica-
ion in column (1) is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the
og rental price on log footfall, log size of the shop, building character-
stics, and shopping district fixed effects. The elasticity of footfall with29 See Fig. B.2 in Appendix B.1 for an example of Amsterdam’s city centre. 
H.R.A. Koster, I. Pasidis and J. van Ommeren Journal of Urban Economics 114 (2019) 103194 
Table 3 
Results for retail rents. 
(Dependent variable: log of rent per m 2 ) 
Footfall Number of shops 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Footfall (log) 0.3737 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3181 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2609 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0149) (0.0203) (0.0181) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) 0.1786 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2066 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1513 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0214) (0.0359) (0.0324) 
Size of property (log) 0.6376 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.6267 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5929 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.6323 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.6283 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5938 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0141) 
Building – new 0.1341 0.0844 0.0877 0.0980 0.0684 0.0671 
(0.0948) (0.0790) (0.0795) (0.0843) (0.0805) (0.0816) 
Building – renovated 0.4123 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3715 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3148 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3256 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3391 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2908 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1162) (0.0830) (0.0842) (0.0928) (0.0880) (0.0847) 
Construction year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4378 4378 4378 4378 4378 
R 2 0.682 0.782 0.821 0.604 0.760 0.807 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. The construction year dummies are categorised as 
follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. 
Location characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures 
< 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations 
< 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 



































































espect to rental price is 0.37. The control variables have plausible signs,
ith larger and renovated properties being more expensive. 30 
The specification in column (1) might suffer from omitted variable
ias due to the omission of unobserved features of a shop location
hat are correlated with footfall. For example, some shopping areas are
ore attractive due to their proximity to a bus stop, school or other
eighbourhood-specific amenities. A partial solution to this problem is
he inclusion of shopping street fixed effects and location characteristics
n column (2), which may mitigate this endogeneity issue. This hardly
ffects the results. 
One may still be concerned that rents are partly dependent on the
mount of footfall a shop generates – so that reverse causality is an issue.
o mitigate this issue, we will include retail sector × chain fixed effects.
hat is, we include a dummy for whether a retail firm is part of a chain
n each retail sector, which should absorb most of the heterogeneity
n expected sales between retail firms. The coefficient in column (3) is
omewhat smaller and now equals 0.26. Thus, a 10% increase in footfall
s associated with a rent increase of 2.6%. 
Columns (4)–(6) in Table 3 focuses on another proxy for shopping
xternalities: the number of shops within 200 m. When using shopping
istrict fixed effects, the elasticity is 0.179 (see column (4)). This elastic-
ty is slightly higher when using shopping street fixed effects in column
5). When controlling for retail sector × chain fixed effects, the elastic-
ty is 0.151. Hence, a 10% increase in the number of shops leads to an
ncrease in rents of 1.5%. The latter elasticity is about 40% lower than
he elasticity with respect to footfall. However, the number of shops in
he vicinity as a proxy for shopping externalities may be measured with
rror, e.g. because we do not know the exact relevant spatial scale of
hopping externalities. We will therefore investigate whether this con-
lusion still holds when using instrumental variables. 
Table 4 further investigates whether the previous results make sense.
e first focus on footfall. In column (1) we include retail firm fixed ef-30 Note that the dummy variable indicating whether the property is new is 
onditional on the construction year, so part of the effect of being in a newer 




f  ects, implying that we include dummies for each and every retail chain
nd independent retail firm. This implies that we compare rent and foot-
all differences of identical firms within the same shopping street. The
esults still indicate a sizeable effect of footfall: a 10% increase in foot-
all is associated with a 1.8% increase in rents. Not surprisingly, because
f the large number of fixed effects, the estimate is less precise and only
tatistically significant at the 5% level. Given the standard error, the es-
imate is not statistically significantly different from the preferred spec-
fication in column (3), Table 3 . 
In column (2) of Table 4 , we control flexibly (using a 5th-order poly-
omial) for the walking time to the centre of the shopping district, by
ncluding a fifth-order polynomial of walking time to the centre. When
ne-stop shoppers are important, they may access shopping districts on
ne location ( e.g. the centre or the edge of a city centre) and then walk
o the intended shop in the centre, while passing many other shops
 Teulings et al., 2017 ). On the other hand, controlling for walking time
o the centre may also partly absorb shopping externalities. Reassur-
ngly, the footfall coefficient is hardly affected. 
One may still be worried that footfall is influenced by the rent that
etail firms have to pay ( e.g. due to rents paid as a function of expected
etail revenues or expected generated footfall). In columns (3) and (4)
e therefore only include retail firms that are unlikely to contribute
substantially) to local footfall. Column (3) only includes shops that are
maller than 90 m 2 (the 25th percentile). The estimate is virtually iden-
ical to the preferred specification. Also when we only focus on retail
rms that are not part of a chain, the estimate is essentially the same.
his seems to suggest that the issue of reverse causality is limited. Impor-
antly, it also strongly suggests that the elasticity of rents with respect
o footfall does not vary between types of firms, i.e. heterogeneity of the
stimates is absent, at least when we distinguish between different sizes
f firms or whether retail firms are part of a chain. We come back to
his issue later on. 
We examine endogeneity concerns further in columns (5)–(9) of
able 4 by using historic instruments. Columns (5) and (6) use the num-
er of cinemas in 1930 within 200 m as an instrument for current foot-
all. With a Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic of about 43, the first-stage ap-
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Table 4 
Footfall and retail rents: extensions. 
(Dependent variable: log of rent per m 2 ) 
Retailer Walking time Small No chain Historic instruments: Historic instruments: 
fixed effects to the centre shops shops cinemas in 1930 shops in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Footfall (log) 0.1820 ∗ ∗ 0.2032 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2556 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2435 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4563 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4348 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4034 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3740 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4799 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0724) (0.0189) (0.0553) (0.0228) (0.1061) (0.0982) (0.1131) (0.1105) (0.2203) 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m (std) 0.0107 
(0.0115) 
Cadastral income (log) − 0.0177 − 0.0213 
(0.0236) (0.0256) 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 − 0.1822 − 0.2700 
(0.2659) (0.3240) 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m (std) − 0.0461 
(0.0868) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Walking time to centre, f (·) No Yes No No No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail firm fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4378 987 2932 4378 4378 2496 2496 2496 
R 2 0.969 0.826 0.873 0.792 
Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic 42.65 48.68 31.46 32.67 17.95 
Endogeneity test 4.858 4.426 0.790 0.795 1.153 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.0275 0.0354 0.374 0.373 0.283 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction 
year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location 
characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, 
public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 






















































t  ears to be strong and meaningful: a standard deviation increase in the
umber of cinemas in 1930 increases current footfall by 12%. 31 The ef-
ect of footfall is now somewhat stronger (0.456), which is statistically
ifferent from the baseline estimate using a Hausman-test, reported at
he bottom of the table. 32 One may be worried that cinemas mostly at-
ract one-stop shoppers. We therefore control for the number of cinemas
n 2010 in column (6). It can immediately be seen that the coefficient
f footfall is hardly affected. Moreover, the current location of cinemas
o not seem to generate higher rents. 
Columns (7)–(9) use an alternative set of instruments, by relying on
ata from the 1832 census. Because these data are only available for
bout 50% of the Netherlands, our number of observations is lower.
olumn (7) indicates a strong first stage: a standard deviation increase
n the number of shops in 1832 increases footfall by 35%. The first stage
s again strong, albeit less strong than when using cinemas in 1930 as an
nstrument. For this specification, the IV estimate is not statistically sig-
ificantly higher than the baseline OLS estimate (the endogeneity test
as a p -value of 0.374). The main advantage of the 1832 data is that
e have information on the Cadastral Income, which is a good proxy of
he value of property in 1832. Of course, there is a fair share (20%) of
issing values, either because land was not (commercially) owned ( e.g.
ecause it was not yet reclaimed from the sea), or it was missing. We
herefore include a dummy indicating whether the Cadastral Income is
issing. In any case, controlling for the Cadastral Income does not make31 The first-stage results are reported in Appendix D.1 . 
32 We have also re-estimated the model by redefining the instrument into a 
ummy variable (we then use a binary variable for the proximity to a cinema). 
ith the dummy instrument the IV estimates are somewhat lower, and based 
n a Hausman test, not statistically significant from the OLS estimates. Conse- 
uently, following arguments developed by Sargan (1958) , and more recently 
mphasised by Young (2019) , one may prefer the OLS estimates, as these have 







ny difference, as the Cadastral Income does not seem to be related to
urrent rents of retail properties. 33 Hence, the assumption that unob-
erved endowments within shopping streets of the past are uncorrelated
o current unobserved store and location characteristics, is even more
lausible. In the final specification we also control for the number of
uildings within 200 m, to make sure that we do not just measure that
ertain shops are in locations that are denser ( e.g. city centres). Col-
mn (9) shows that it is indeed the locations shops in 1832 that matter
or current footfall, as the effect of number of buildings is statistically
nsignificant. The coefficient also becomes somewhat stronger, but be-
ause of the wide confidence bands, it is not statistically significantly
ifferent from the baseline OLS estimate. 
In Table 5 we repeat the same set of specifications, but now using
he other measure for shopping externalities: the number of shops in
he vicinity. When using retail firm fixed effects, or when controlling
exibly for the walking time to the centre of the shopping district, the
stimates are about 50% lower (respectively columns (1) and (2)). How-
ver, when focusing on small stores or when only including chain stores,
he elasticities are comparable to the baseline estimates (respectively
olumns (3) and (4)). Again, the results strongly suggest an absence of
etween-firm heterogeneity in the elasticity of rent with respect to shop-
ing externalities. 
In columns (5)–(9) we use historic instruments. In all specifications,
he impact of number of shops is much higher when using IV than when
sing OLS. In most specifications, endogeneity tests indicate that the
stimates using instruments are significantly higher. An important ob-
ervation is that the IV estimates for the elasticity of number of shops are
ery comparable to IV estimates for the elasticity of rent with respect to33 Furthermore, the unconditional correlation between log price and log cadas- 
ral income per ha is only 0.1505, and the unconditional correlation between 
hese variables without logarithms is essentially zero (and equals −0 . 01 ). 
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Table 5 
Number of shops and retail rents: extensions. 
(Dependent variable: log of rent per m 2 ) 
Retailer Walking time Small No chain Historic instruments: Historic instruments: 
fixed effects to the centre shops shops cinemas in 1930 shops in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) 0.0740 0.0626 ∗ ∗ 0.2145 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1364 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4334 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4502 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3404 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2931 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4541 
(0.0860) (0.0262) (0.0716) (0.0372) (0.1164) (0.1215) (0.1219) (0.1022) (0.2884) 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m (std) − 0.0088 
(0.0122) 
Cadastral income (log) − 0.0402 − 0.0594 
(0.0284) (0.0488) 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 − 0.1031 − 0.2300 
(0.2499) (0.3711) 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m (std) − 0.0895 
(0.1545) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Walking time to centre, f (·) No Yes No No No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail firm fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4378 987 2932 4378 4378 2496 2496 2496 
R 2 0.968 0.817 0.871 0.777 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 48.68 46.64 42.31 62.02 13.88 
Endogeneity test 9.380 9.839 4.588 2.350 2.301 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.00219 0.00171 0.0322 0.125 0.129 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction 
year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location 
characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, 
public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 




















































i  ootfall. We think that the most likely interpretation of these results is
hat historic instruments reduce issues related to reverse causality and
articularly mitigate measurement error in the number of shops as a
roxy for shopping externalities. Historic instruments mitigate this mea-
urement error, because these are arguably uncorrelated to this type of
easurement error. 34 
To summarise, we find that both footfall and the number of shops in
he vicinity have a positive effect on rents, as expected. When using OLS,
e find estimates for footfall of around 0.25, whereas for the number
f shops the elasticity is about 0.15. A lower estimate for number of
hops makes sense, because it has substantial measurement error (as it
oes not distinguish between sizes of shops). When using instrumental
ariables, we find evidence that the estimated effects of footfall and
umber of shops are roughly the same and range from 0.30–0.45. Note
hat the latter estimates have larger confidence intervals, in particular
hen focusing on the effect of number of shops, and do not always differ
rom the OLS estimates using Hausman tests. 
Currently, it is common to measure agglomeration economies us-
ng employment at a highly aggregate level, and more specifically fo-
using on wages. As emphasised by Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) , by
ocusing on rents, and by examining local measures of agglomeration
hat are relevant for the industry examined, e.g. number of shops in our
ontext, elasticities may be quite different. Using rents, the study by
oster et al. (2014) reports agglomeration elasticities of employment34 It seems unlikely that the spatial relationships between cinemas in 1930 or 
he number of shops in 1832 and the number of shops in the vicinity is the 
ame as the spatial relationship between shopping externalities and the current 
umber of shops. If there would be a strong correlation, the instruments are 
nlikely to address measurement error. Nevertheless, one may argue that the 
easurement error may be correlated when choosing the same distance cut-off
which is 200 m). We therefore have experimented with using instruments based 










c  ensity that are about 0.10 for retailers (substantially larger than the
ame elasticity for business services and manufacturing which is esti-
ated to be about 0.04). Their estimate is still far below our estimated
gglomeration elasticities of number of shops (as well as footfall) imply-
ng that employment density is a poor proxy for agglomeration for retail
ompared to retail specific measures ( i.e. number of shops, footfall) that
re used in the current paper. 
.2. Shopping externalities and vacancy rates 
In Table 6 , we report the results for the incidence of a shop being
acant as a function of footfall using a Linear Probability Model (LPM)
ased on a similar set of specifications as in the previous subsection.
olumn (1) is a naïve regression of a dummy variable, which indicates
f a shop is vacant on log footfall, the log footprint area of the building,
onstruction year dummies, shopping district and year fixed effects. The
oefficient implies that when footfall increases by 10%, the vacancy rate
ecreases by 0.31 percentage points – about 5% of the mean vacancy
ate. 
The estimated effect is slightly higher when we include location char-
cteristics and shopping street fixed effects in column (2). This preferred
LS estimate indicates that a 10% increase in footfall leads to a decrease
n the vacancy rate of 0.35 percentage points. Given an average vacancy
ate of 6.1%, this implies a reduction in vacancy rates of 5.7%. 
Column (3) investigates whether the effects of footfall on the inci-
ence of being vacant is different. When focusing on building footprints
qual to or smaller than 25 m 2 , the results are similar. Also when con-
rolling flexibly for walking time to the centre, the results are not sub-
tantially affected. Using long-lagged instruments in columns (5)–(9) of
able 6 should address any remaining endogeneity issues. In column
5) we use cinemas in 1930 as an instrument for current footfall. In line
ith the analysis for rents, the coefficient becomes stronger. A 10% in-
rease in footfall is now associated with a decrease in the vacancy rate
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Table 6 
Footfall and vacancies. 
(Dependent variable: shop is vacant) 
District Shopping street Small Walking time Historic instruments: Historic instruments: 
fixed effects fixed effects shops to the centre cinemas in 1930 shops in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Footfall (log) − 0.0314 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0352 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0302 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0326 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0710 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0640 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0290 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0328 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0146 
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0138) 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m (std) − 0.0036 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0011) 
Cadastral income (log) 0.0021 0.0029 
(0.0018) (0.0018) 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 0.0147 0.0255 
(0.0239) (0.0233) 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m (std) − 0.0109 
(0.0069) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Walking time to centre, f (·) No No No Yes No No No No No 
Shopping district fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail firm fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 410,544 410,544 108,073 410,064 410,544 410,544 410,544 218,271 218,271 
R 2 0.0276 0.0442 0.0617 0.0443 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 80.24 84.20 129.6 145.1 43.87 
Endogeneity test 15.93 11.27 0.803 4.90e-05 1.901 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 6.58e-05 0.000786 0.370 0.994 0.168 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction 
year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location 
characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, 
public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 






















































35 From a small subset of the observations in Strabo , we know that the average 
contract length is 6.77 years, whereas the average vacancy rate is 0.061. Hence, 
𝜅 = 0 . 175∕(6 . 77 × 0 . 061) = 0 . 426 . 
36 For footfall, these are reported in column (3) of Table 3 , column (2) of 
Table 6 , columns (6) and (9) of Table 4 . For the number of shops, those are 
based on column (6) of Table 3 , column (2) of Table 7 , columns (6) and (9) of 
Table 5 . f 0.7 percentage points. The estimate is statistically different from the
omparable OLS estimate, as indicated by the endogeneity test. Control-
ing for the current number of cinemas does not change this result (see
olumn (6)). 
In columns (7)–(9) of Table 6 , we use an alternative instrument –
he number of shops in 1832 within 200 m. The coefficient is now much
loser to the baseline OLS estimate. A 10% increase in footfall is asso-
iated with a 0.29 percentage points increase in the vacancy rate. This
stimate is slightly higher when we control for the Cadastral Income
nd somewhat lower when we control for the number of buildings in
832. Although the latter estimate is not statistically significant at con-
entional levels, it is not significantly different from the OLS estimate
ither. 
We repeat the same set of specifications, but now using the number
f shops within 200 m as a proxy for shopping externalities. Table 7
eports the results. Columns (1)–(4) report OLS estimates. The preferred
stimate in column (2) shows that a 10% increase in the number of shops
s associated with an increase of 0.5 percentage points in the vacancy
ate. This effect is close to the estimate for footfall. 
In the last 5 columns of Table 7 we use historic instruments. The
stimates based on cinemas in 1930 show similar results to the OLS es-
imates (see columns (5) and (6). When using shops in 1832 the coeffi-
ients are somewhat lower, although the difference is hardly statistically
ignificant. 
All in all, we find that both footfall and number of shops in the vicin-
ty have a negative effect on the vacancy rate, in line with expectations.
e find again evidence that the estimated coefficients for footfall and
umber of shops are similar and range from 0.03–0.05. 
.3. Shopping externalities and rental income 
In Section 2.1 , we argued that shopping externalities are expected
o capitalise into rental incomes of shop owners. Rental incomes areefined as the annual shop rent paid by retail firms multiplied by the
hare of the time that the shop is occupied. Given the effect of footfall
n retail rents and vacancies that we estimated in Sections 5.1 and 5.2,
able 8 provides the estimates for the effect of shopping externalities
n rental income. Following Eq. (2) , we calculate this effect assuming
ifferent values of 𝜅: 
𝜕 log 𝐼 𝑖𝑗 
𝜕 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗 
= 
𝜕 log 𝑝 𝑖𝑗 
𝜕 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗 
− (1 + 𝜅) 
𝜕𝑣 𝑖𝑗 
𝜕 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗 
. (14)
ecall that 𝜅 is a positive parameter that defines the relationship be-
ween advertising cost and rental price. We assume that 𝜅 is equal to
.426, based on the costs of letting commercial space, which is about
7.5% of the yearly rental value in the Netherlands ( Leurs, 2017 ). 35 We
lso will estimate specifications where we either assume that fees are
ero ( 𝜅 = 0 ) or that fees are several times higher and equal to 50% of
he annual rental value, so that 𝜅 = 1 . 2185 . 
Following Section 2.2, Table 8 reports the estimated elasticities for
he preferred specifications. 36 In the first three columns we focus on
he elasticity of rental income with respect to footfall, denoted by 𝜀 I,f .
olumn (1) reports the estimated elasticity based on the preferred OLS
pecifications. We find elasticities of around 0.3, depending on the value
f 𝜅 we assume. However, it can be seen that using wildly different
alues for advertising costs 𝜅 makes little difference for the estimated
lasticity. When we concentrate on the 2SLS estimates using historic
nstruments, the elasticity of rental income with respect to footfall is
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Table 7 
Number of shops and vacancies. 
(Dependent variable: shop is vacant) 
District Shopping street Small Walking time Historic instruments: Historic instruments: 
fixed effects fixed effects shops to the centre cinemas in 1930 shops in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) − 0.0382 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0505 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0382 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0420 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0579 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0540 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0332 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0358 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0135 
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0129) 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m (std) − 0.0025 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0011) 
Cadastral income (log) 0.0034 ∗ ∗ 0.0034 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 0.0277 0.0317 
(0.0210) (0.0211) 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m − 0.0001 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0000) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Walking time to centre, f (·) No No No Yes No No No No No 
Shopping district fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail firm fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 410,544 410,544 108,073 410,064 410,544 410,544 410,544 218,271 218,271 
R 2 0.0203 0.0404 0.0589 0.0406 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 282.8 284.8 299.7 367.6 97.74 
Endogeneity test 0.979 0.240 4.252 3.486 9.017 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.322 0.624 0.0392 0.0619 0.00268 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction 
year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location 
characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, 
public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 
p < 0.10 
Table 8 
The elasticity of rental income with respect to shopping externalities. 
Footfall Number of shops 
Baseline Cinemas Shops Baseline Cinemas Shops 
specification in 1930 in 1832 specification in 1930 in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
𝜅 = 0 . 426 0.311 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.526 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.528 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.223 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.527 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.559 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0160) (0.0863) (0.188) (0.0287) (0.108) (0.276) 
𝜅 = 0 . 000 0.296 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.499 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.523 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.202 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.504 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.554 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0159) (0.0859) (0.188) (0.0285) (0.107) (0.276) 
𝜅 = 1 . 218 0.339 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.577 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.536 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.263 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.570 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.566 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0162) (0.0875) (0.189) (0.0293) (0.110) (0.275) 
Notes : This is a Zellner -style seemingly unrelated regression, where error terms 
are allowed to be correlated across the rent and vacancy rate equation. We in- 
clude shop and location characteristics, as well as shopping street fixed effects, 
retail sector × branch fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard er- 
rors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 






























37 This number is the product of the log footfall coefficient of 0.5 and the av- 
erage annual rental income per m 2 ( € 309 per m 2 ) divided by the product of the 
mean footfall (13,328), multiplied by 5 (because footfall on Saturdays is one 
fifth of weekly footfall) and by the number of weeks in a year. 
38 The order of magnitude of this result seems to make sense. Let us suppose 
that one out of hundred persons who pass a certain shop also enter that shop. 
Furthermore, assume that 25% of those who enter the shop also make a purchase 
and the profit per purchase is equal to € 3. The marginal profit of footfall for a 
shop is then equal to 0 . 01 × 0 . 25 × 3 = € 0.0075. 
39 In Appendix D.3 we investigate further whether internalisation occurs by 
exploiting ancillary information on whether store owners possess multiple prop- 
erties in a street (which applies to 18% of the shops). We show that shops owned 
by multiple store owners do not have a different footfall elasticity. onsiderably higher and around 0.5, independently of the instruments
e use. 
Let us now focus on the alternative measure of shopping externali-
ies: the elasticity of rental income with respect to the number of shops
ithin 200 m. Table 8 uses the estimated effects of the number of shops
n each shopping street on rents and vacancies. The estimates obtained
rom the OLS specifications are again lower and around 0.22, while the
stimates based on historic instruments are around 0.5. Hence, 𝜀 I,f seems
o be roughly the same as 𝜀 I,N . 
Let us now calculate the marginal effect of footfall on rental income
n absolute terms, using Table 8 . Recall that the average footfall on a
ypical Saturday is around 14,000, whereas average annual rent per m 2 or a shop is about € 300. In general, footfall on Saturday is roughly
ne fifth of weekly footfall ( Locatus, 2006 ). Let us increase footfall by
ne pedestrian in each day of the year. The annual increase in rental
ncome per m 2 is then approximately € 0.000045. 37 Consequently, the
onetary benefit of one additional pedestrian passing a shop with an
verage size of about 200 m 2 is estimated to be about € 0.009. 38 In the
ame way, it can be shown that the monetary benefit of one additional
hop is about € 0.65 per m 2 , hence the marginal benefit for a shop with
n average size of about 200 m 2 is about € 130. Hence, the share of
etail firms’ rental expenditure spent on agglomeration is, on average,
bout 0.43. Such a high share is in line with Koster et al. (2014) and is
onform intuition as we focus on retail firms that choose to locate within
expensive) shopping streets, because of positive shopping externalities.
.4. Welfare analysis 
We have shown that shopping externalities are important and ar-
ued that due to fragmented ownership of shops, it is implausible that
hopping externalities are internalised. 39 



























































































































d  We will now examine policies that subsidise store owners. Our focus
s on local agglomeration economies. Local variation of agglomeration
apitalisation into wages will be assumed to be absent. This is reason-
ble to assume, because differences in commuting time between local
hops are essentially zero. Consequently, localised labour supply will be
ssumed to be perfectly elastic, and all productivity gains are reflected
n rental income. 
We aim to make statements about welfare improvements that are
ossible using subsidies, but we do not make any claims about the
agnitude of the welfare improvement. The latter relies, among other
hings, on assumptions about whether the local (as well as total) demand
or shopping is elastic or inelastic. Our argument for subsidies is that, in
ontrast to shopping malls, there is no owner/manager who internalises
he shopping externalities and who will choose an optimal amount and
omposition of shops. 
We have demonstrated that the elasticity of rental income with re-
pect to number of shops 𝜀 I,N is about 0.5 (see Table 8 ). Given this elas-
icity, we calculate the optimal subsidy for store owners, which is equal
o the marginal external benefit of one additional shop. Eq. (6) implies
hat the optimal subsidy to store owners is about 50% of rental income,
hich is substantial. Given an average rental income of about € 50 thou-
and, the optimal annual subsidy per shop is about € 25 thousand, on
verage (using the median rental income of about € 34 thousand, pro-
ides an optimal annual subsidy per shop of about € 17 thousand). Such
 number is not implausibly high, at least compared to the millions of
hoppers who pass a shop each year (average annual footfall is about
.5 million). Optimal subsidies vary strongly between different shop-
ing streets. Larger shopping streets must receive higher levels of sub-
idies, because there are more shops and because rental income levels
re higher in these streets. In our data, it turns out that the 25 largest
hopping streets (of the population of about thousand shopping streets)
ould receive about 25% of all national subsidies. 
We are also interested in the optimal subsidy to footfall. We use the
ight-hand side of Eq. (9) , which equals N · I · 𝜀 I,f / f given the assumption
f homogeneous retail firms. The elasticity of rental income with respect
o footfall 𝜀 I,f is estimated to be about 0.5 (see Table 8 ). The median of
 · I / f is about 1.56 (the mean, excluding extreme outliers, is about 30%
igher). Consequently, the marginal external benefit of one shopper is
bout € 0.78. Although it is difficult to judge whether such a number
akes sense, we note that it is low compared to typical subsidies to
ublic transport or parking, which are usually justified by policy makers
s these subsidies are argued to induce more shoppers. 
At this point, we would like to point out four caveats. The first caveat
s that our estimates of the optimal subsidies to store owners and to
ootfall depend on the assumption with respect to the number of shops
assed by a typical shopper. In the calculation of the optimal subsidy,
e have assumed that shops benefit from other shops within 200 m. In
he calculations of the optimal footfall subsidy, we have assumed that
 shopper passes all other shops within 200 m. We note that with other
hresholds the coefficients and resulting subsidies are similar, but not
dentical. 40 
The second caveat is that the subsidy is only optimal in the first-best
quilibrium, hence it assumes the absence of other externalities. In this
ontext, it is important to emphasise the presence of negative crowding
ithin shopping streets as well as negative, but under-priced, travel ex-
ernalities of shoppers who travel by car towards shopping streets caus-
ng road congestion. We believe that the extent of negative crowding ex-
ernalities within shopping streets are present but usually small, except
or special days ( e.g. Black Friday, the weekend before Christmas), which
uggest that the subsidies should be somewhat smaller than suggested40 For example, when choosing 250 m as threshold, the external benefit of one 
hopper is about € 1, while when setting the threshold to 100 m, the external 
enefit is € 0.60. In Appendix D.3 we also estimate the effects of number of 




bove. Further, it is a priori not clear whether a higher concentration of
hops stimulated by policy reduces or amplifies road congestion. Given
hat the proportion of shoppers who visit multiple shops is high, a higher
oncentration of shops induces shoppers to make only one trip by car,
o that it is possible that such policy would reduce total distance trav-
lled by car, and therefore road congestion. However, if shops are more
oncentrated, people may have to drive further to the nearest shopping
treet, which may lead to more congestion. Hence, whether the subsidy
alculated above has to be somewhat adjusted upwards or downwards
s not so clear. 
A third caveat is that we ignored any effects of new shops and footfall
n product prices. These prices will be fixed for retail firms that are part
f a chain (about one third of our observations), but may adjust for
on-chain firms. The welfare effects of adjustments in product prices
re expected to be included in the rent estimates ( i.e. retail firms can
sk higher product prices will be willing to pay higher rents), except if
arket power in the product market is strongly correlated to footfall or
umber of shops. 
Finally, in these calculations, we assumed that 𝜀 I,N and 𝜀 I,f are con-
tant, and therefore do not differ between firms located within shopping
treets. This may not be very realistic when firms differ in the extent that
hey benefit from the presence of other firms. This has important reper-
ussions for the introduction of a non-marginal subsidy, as it implicitly
ssumes that 𝜀 I,N and 𝜀 I,f do not vary with the level of the subsidy. Ar-
uably, if this assumption does not hold, the subsidy induces sorting of
etail firms: firms with different underlying parameters enter (or leave)
he shopping street, such that the values of 𝜀 I,N and 𝜀 I,f will change. To
xamine this further, in the next section, we allow the effects of foot-
all and number of shops on rents to be retail firm-specific. We provide,
owever, evidence that between-retail-firms heterogeneity is of limited
mportance. This suggests that due to the introduction of a non-marginal
ubsidy, the type of firms in shopping streets, at least as measured by
 I,N and 𝜀 I,f , will not substantially change, which increases the external
alidity of the welfare-optimal subsidy estimates. 
So far, we have examined the use of subsidies to store owners as a
eans of internalising shopping externalities. As an alternative to sub-
idies, policymakers may also use policies which aim to influence the
umber (and even the composition) of shops directly. In particular, zon-
ng is likely to be a welfare-increasing instrument, but only if the regu-
ator has sufficient information about what should be the optimal size
f a shopping district. Note that in absence of such information, zoning
egulations restricting shopping areas to grow ( e.g. , at the expense of
esidential housing) is unlikely to be optimal because of the magnitude
f shopping externalities. 
Until this point, we have ignored the effects of the subsidies on shop-
ing demand. In the absence of externalities other than shopping exter-
alities ( e.g. crowding and road congestion externalities), reductions in
emand elsewhere would not affect our main welfare arguments, but it
ould reduce the magnitude of welfare gains if these welfare benefits
ere calculated only at the locations which receive subsidies. 41 In this
ontext, inelastic total demand seems a reasonable assumption before
he rise of online shopping, as shown by Rosenthal and Ross (2010) . In
his case, welfare gains would still arise from spatial concentration of re-
ail, because of reduced transport cost associated with shopping. On the
ther hand, nowadays it is plausible that total demand for street shop-
ing is elastic, as it strongly competes with online shopping. Moreover,
ourism has become more important for shopping in city centres. Be-
ause spatially-concentrated retail clusters nowadays attract tourism, it
s plausible that demand becomes even more elastic. Consequently, pro-
uctivity and welfare gains of subsidies, at the level of the city, might
e larger. 41 Note we refrain from any exercise which tries to evaluate the welfare effects 
f local subsidies, because one needs a full-fledged structural equilibrium model 
o say anything about the net welfare gains of such a subsidy. 














































































































u  . Extensions and sensitivity analysis 
.1. Heterogeneity 
Shopping externalities are likely heterogeneous between different
tores. Hence, conclusions regarding non-marginal policies highly de-
end on whether the willingness to pay for footfall and for number of
hops vary between different types of shops. To address this issue, we
e-estimate the hedonic price function, but allow the parameters to vary
y retail characteristics. 42 
Hence, in line with Eq. (11) , we have: 
og 𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑗 + 𝜓 𝑖 ∈𝑘 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 . (15)
ote that the parameters 𝛼i , which captures shopping externalities s ijt ,
nd 𝛽 i , which captures the effect of control variables x ijt , are both retail
rm-specific. Identifying these parameters is not possible without addi-
ional restrictions, as estimating 𝛼i and 𝛽 i separately for each firm would
mply that we have have no degrees of freedom. We therefore use a semi-
arametric Kernel-smoothing procedure, where 𝛼i and 𝛽 i are allowed to
epend, in a flexible way, on firm characteristics z i . In Appendix C.1 we
utline this procedure in detail, explain how to determine the smooth-
ng parameter and how we deal with instrumental variables using a so-
alled ‘control function’ approach. Given 𝛼𝑖 , estimated for footfall and
umber of shops, we recover ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 ( 𝑖 ) and ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 ) . 
Following Bajari and Kahn (2005) and Koster et al. (2014) , in a sec-
nd step, we aim to explain heterogeneity by relating ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 ( 𝑖 ) and ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 )
o firm characteristics. We rely here on straightforward linear regression
echniques by estimating: 
 ̂𝜀 𝐼,𝑓 ( 𝑖 ) , ̂𝜀 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 )} = 𝜂𝑧 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 , (16)
here 𝜂 are parameters to be estimated and 𝜈it is an error term. To obtain
tandard errors we cluster bootstrap the standard errors in this two-step
rocedure. 
We report results with respect to the first step of the estimation pro-
edure in Fig. 2 . We report distributions of ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 ( 𝑖 ) and ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 ) . Fig. 2 (a)
hows that the distribution of 𝜀 I,f ranges from 0.25 to 0.35. When instru-
enting for footfall with cinemas in 1930, the estimates have a larger
pread and range from 0.27 to 0.67, but most of the estimates are still
etween 0.39 and 0.55 (see Fig. 2 (b)). In Fig. 2 (c) we find that the dis-
ribution of 𝜀 I,N ranges from 0.16 to 0.26. There is also limited hetero-
eneity in the estimates where we instrument for the number of shops
see Fig. 2 (d)): the estimates range from 0.46 to 0.56. Again, we do not
nd evidence of substantial heterogeneity. 
In Table 9 we aim to explain heterogeneity using retail firm charac-
eristics. The constant shows that the annual estimates are close to the
aseline results. 43 We find limited evidence in column (1) that stores
elling daily items, cafés and restaurants, and services have a lower pref-
rence for footfall, although the estimates are statistically insignificant
hen we instrument. On the other hand, when we use instruments, we
nd that stores that are part of a retail chain seem to have a somewhat
igher preference for footfall. 
All in all, we find limited evidence that heterogeneity is very impor-
ant. This may seem surprising, but we note that the focus of this paper
s on designated shopping streets. Hence, retail firms that do not have a
trong preference for footfall will not locate in those areas. For example,42 We will maintain the assumption that the effect on the vacancy rate is ho- 
ogeneous (as we do not observe retail characteristics for vacant properties). 
ecause of the small contribution of the effect of footfall and number of shops 
hrough changes in vacancy rates in ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 ( 𝑖 ) and ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 ( 𝑖 ) (see Table 8 ), we do not 
onsider this as a major drawback. 
43 We do not report results using shops in 1832 as instruments. Because our 
ample is then much smaller, it appears that we have too limited power to esti- 










f  rms like IKEA or WalMart attract usually one-stop shoppers, but usu-
lly do not locate in shopping streets or malls. The lack of heterogeneity
trongly suggest that the results derived in the welfare analysis also hold
or non-marginal policy changes. 
.2. Sensitivity analysis 
We subject our results to several robustness checks. First, in
ppendix D.2 we consider to what extent omitted variables bias our
aseline estimates for rents, by applying Oster’s (2019) methodology to
rovide bias-corrected estimates. The resulting coefficients appear to be
ery close to the reported baseline estimates. 
We report many more robustness checks. In Appendix D.3 we focus
n rents, while in Appendix D.4 we report results for vacancies. 
First, we consider an alternative identification strategy where we
ompare shops near shopping street intersections. Hence, rather than
dentifying the effects within shopping streets, we now compare differ-
nces in footfall and number of shops between shopping streets that in-
ersect. Then, we only keep observations within 250 m of an intersection
nd include fixed effects for each shopping street intersection. By using
he spatial variation in footfall between intersecting streets, we control
or unobserved locational endowments that attract both shoppers and
etail firms ( e.g. free parking etc.). We show that the results are very
uch comparable to the baseline specifications using shopping street
xed effects. 
Second, one may argue that different real estate agents have dif-
erent bargaining power or sales strategies, which may lead to dif-
erent observed rents and/or unreported incentives. However, when
ncluding real estate agent fixed effects the results are essentially
naffected. 
Third,use observations of rents and vacancies in order to get infor-
ation about rental income, but one may also consider to use sales price
irectly. We only have 110 sales price observations, so we cannot use
etailed fixed effects or instrument for shopping externalities. Never-
heless, the point estimates are in line with the baseline results using
ents. 
We further show the effects of shopping externalities on log rents
sing quadratic specifications of log footfall to allow for non-linear ef-
ects of the logarithm of footfall. In OLS specifications we find evidence
f a positive non-linear effect, but when we instrument, this effect is
ighly statistically insignificant. We also show that the results are ro-
ust when using different thresholds in counting the number of shops
n the vicinity ( e.g. 100 m, 200 m, 250 m). 
Policies that foster retail concentration can be welfare improving
nly if shopping externalities are not (fully) internalised. We also ar-
ued that the highly fragmented property ownership that we find in our
ample implies that internalisation is unlikely to occur. In Appendix D.3 ,
e test whether the effect of footfall on retail rents is capitalised differ-
ntly in properties that belong to store owners who possess multiple
ental properties in the same shopping street, which we label as multi-
roperty owners. For multi-property owners, the externality seems to
apitalise in rents in the same way as for single property owners. To
urther investigate the issue of internalisation, we investigate whether
hopping externalities capitalise differently in rents when the owner is a
rivate investor. We do not find evidence for this scenario. Furthermore,
sing information on area-based retail associations from Menger (2014) ,
e also do not find evidence that externalities are internalised by retail
ssociations. 
We also investigate the robustness of the estimates of the impact of
hopping externalities on vacancy rates in Appendix D.4 . We show that
esults are similar when we use the alternative identification strategy
ith shopping street intersection fixed effects. Moreover, it appears that
sing a Probit model instead of a Linear Probability Model, the estimates
f the effect of shopping externalities on vacancy rates are very similar.
There might be alternative explanations that explain the effect of
ootfall on retail vacancy rates. One such explanation is that the effect of
H.R.A. Koster, I. Pasidis and J. van Ommeren Journal of Urban Economics 114 (2019) 103194 
Fig. 2. Results of the first step. 
Table 9 
Explaining variation in ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 and ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 . 
Dependent variable: ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 ?̂? 𝐼,𝑓 ?̂? 𝐼,𝑁 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Instruments used in first stage: Cinemas in 1930 
Part of retail chain 0.0083 0.0026 0.0618 ∗ 0.0127 
(0.0069) (0.0112) (0.0343) (0.0157) 
Small shop − 0.0023 0.0079 − 0.0639 ∗ ∗ − 0.0143 
(0.0062) (0.0098) (0.0311) (0.0117) 
Large shop − 0.0036 − 0.0054 0.033 0.0034 
(0.0079) (0.0118) (0.0316) (0.0134) 
Food store − 0.0055 0.0203 − 0.0172 0.0011 
(0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0441) (0.0180) 
Daily items − 0.0142 ∗ ∗ − 0.0015 − 0.0204 − 0.0021 
(0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0224) (0.0088) 
Sports and leisure − 0.0142 0.0225 ∗ 0.0539 0.0169 
(0.0112) (0.0126) (0.0431) (0.0166) 
Living − 0.0153 0.0104 − 0.0175 0.0028 
(0.0123) (0.0172) (0.041) (0.0161) 
Other retail stores − 0.0130 0.0219 0.0292 0.0116 
(0.0132) (0.0160) (0.0586) (0.0187) 
Cafés, restaurants, leisure − 0.0228 ∗ − 0.0007 − 0.0604 − 0.0005 
(0.0132) (0.023) (0.0461) (0.0175) 
Specialised stores − 0.0126 0.0207 − 0.0192 0.0000 
(0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0475) (0.0172) 
Services − 0.0251 ∗ ∗ 0.0155 − 0.0535 − 0.0122 
(0.0128) (0.0138) (0.0483) (0.0185) 
Constant 0.3246 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1884 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5107 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5241 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0249) (0.0386) (0.104) (0.1395) 
Number of observations 4378 4378 4378 4378 
R 2 0.743 0.718 0.901 0.938 
Notes : Clothing stores are the omitted category. Bootstrapped standard errors (100 
replication) are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ 












i  ootfall on vacancy rates is only relevant in times of low demand, when
or certain shops, the marginal costs of providing shop space are below
he marginal benefits (see e.g. Teulings et al., 2017 ). On the other hand,
n times of high demand, for almost all retail establishments, marginal
osts are lower than the marginal benefits, thus, the effect of footfall
n vacancy rates could be negligible. In order to test this scenario, weegress the dummy for vacant shops on shopping externalities and on the
nteraction term between shopping externalities and a dummy variable
or the recent boom (and bust) period of the Dutch economy. Our results
how that the effect of footfall on vacancy rates is significantly different
n the boom and bust periods. Specifically, the effect in bust periods
s higher, as expected. However, the effect of footfall on vacancy rates























































































































𝑝  s still economically and statistically significant during the boom years.
his results confirm that higher rents increase the opportunity cost of
aving an empty shop, so that vacancy rates are lower in more attractive
reas ( i.e. those with a higher footfall). 
Finally, in Appendix D.4 we make a distinction between the effects
f shopping externalities on short-term (less than 1 year) and long-term
at least 3 years) vacancies. This could be interpreted as the difference
etween ‘frictional’ and ‘structural’ vacancies. We do not find systematic
vidence that shopping externalities do impact short-term and long-term
acancies differently. 
. Conclusions 
The findings of this paper add to our understanding of retail cluster-
ng and shopping externalities. We use a novel proxy for shopping exter-
alities – footfall – together with a more standard proxy – the number
f shops in the vicinity. Economic theory indicates that (i) shop rents
epend positively on footfall and the number of shops in the vicinity,
nd (ii) vacancies depend negatively on footfall. Hence, the effect of
hopping externalities on rental income – the shop rent multiplied with
he share of the time that the shop is occupied – is positive. 
Our empirical estimates for the main shopping streets of the Nether-
ands show that the effects of footfall on retail rents and vacancies
re substantial. Shopping externalities are therefore crucial to retail lo-
ation choices, as higher footfall leads to higher rental income, with
n elasticity in the range 0.25–0.50. Such a high elasticity is consis-
ent with the notion that the main reason for shops to cluster is the
resence of positive shopping externalities. We use instrumental vari-
bles based on retail locations in 1930 (and even 1832), which ad-
ress a range of endogeneity issues. When instrumenting, the elastic-
ty of rental income with respect to footfall and the elasticity of rental
ncome with respect number of shops in the vicinity are about the
ame. 
We find limited evidence that the elasticities are very heterogeneous,
hich underlines that retail property markets are highly competitive
nd that shopping streets attract retail firms that benefit in a similar
ay from shopping externalities. The type of firms attracted to locate
n expensive shopping streets is highly selective ( e.g. , 30% of shops are
lothing stores), and the high rents dissuade retail firms that cannot reap
he benefits of shopping externalities. 
We demonstrate that it is implausible that the positive externali-
ies in shopping streets are internalised due to the high fragmented
wnership of shops, in contrast to shopping malls. To formulate our
olicy recommendations, we derive (i) the shopâs marginal benefit
f a pedestrian passing by, (ii) the optimal subsidy to store owners
s an incentive to provide more retail space in an existing shopping
treet. 
We have shown that shopping externalities are important – the shop’s
arginal benefit of a passing pedestrian is about € 0.009. The optimal
ubsidy to store owners is about 25% of rental expenditure (or even
igher), about € 12,500 per year. We are aware that explicit subsidies
o private firms are controversial and may even be illegal. However, cur-
ent policy practices in many cities around the world to pedestrianise
ertain streets in attractive city centres and the provision of subsidised
ublic transport or subsidies to short-term parking space close to shop-
ing streets are an implicit subsidy to enhance shopping externalities.
rom the perspective of the retail market, those policies seem welfare
mproving. 
ppendix A 
1. Theoretical model 
Let us introduce a search model of a shopping street with two types
f homogeneous agents. Store owners that possess properties and retail
rms, which rent properties from the store owners. Store owners withacant properties and retail firms searching for space have to search for
ach other. Store owners set the level of advertising expenditure which
etermines the contact rate with retail firms. Given a contact, the agents
se Nash bargaining to determine the rent level. We assume steady-state
nd a given number of store owners, which possess one shop each, which
hey aim to rent out to a retail firm for rent p . For simplicity, the revenue
f a shop is equal to footfall in the street. For now, we assume that the
umber of shops and footfall are exogenous. The future is discounted at
ate r . Owners and retail firms maximise their profits. 
Retail firms go bankrupt at a given rate 𝛿, which creates vacant prop-
rties. Owners with a vacancy and retail firms searching for shop space
earch for each other. The rate at which they find each other is de-
ned by a concave matching function m . This matching function de-
ends positively on the overall advertising expenditures: the number of
acant shops v times advertising expenditure e per property, ev . Thus,
 = 𝑚 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) . Vacant shops become occupied at a rate q ( v, e ), defined by
 ( ev )/ v . This rate depends negatively on v , due to the concavity assump-
ion of the matching function. Owners with a vacancy incur advertising
osts c ( e ). Advertising costs are an increasing convex function of ad-
ertising expenditure, whereas 𝑐(0) = 0 . When an owner with a vacancy
nd a searching retail firm meet each other, they bargain about the shop
rice p , given a bargaining parameter 𝛽, where 0 < 𝛽 < 1. Rental income
f the property owner is equal to 𝑝 (1 − 𝑣 ) − 𝑐𝑣 . 
The market for retail firms is competitive with free entry of search-
ng retail firms, so the expected profit of searching retail firms is equal
o zero. Store owners with vacancies choose their advertising expendi-
ure conditional on the advertising expenditure of other store owners.
e consider symmetric equilibria where owners choose the same adver-
ising expenditure. The latter implies that for the representative owner,
he marginal increase in the matching rate of advertising expenditure is
qual to the average rate, so 𝜕 𝑚 ∕ 𝜕 𝑒 = 𝑚 ∕ 𝑒 . Similarly, 𝜕 𝑚 ∕ 𝜕 𝑣 = 𝑚 ∕ 𝑣 . 
In steady-state, the inflow rate of shops is equal to the outflow rate,
mplying that: 
 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) = 𝛿(1 − 𝑣 ) . (A.1)
he present-discounted value of expected profits of a vacant shop, V ,
an be written as: 
𝑉 = − 𝑐( 𝑒 ) + 𝑚 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) 
𝑣 
( 𝑅 − 𝑉 ) , (A.2)
here R denotes the present discounted value of expected profits of a
hop that is rented out. The latter can be written as: 
𝑅 = 𝑝 + 𝛿( 𝑉 − 𝑅 ) . (A.3)
he present-discounted value of expected profits for a retail firm equals:
𝑆 = 𝑓 − 𝑝 − 𝛿( 𝑆 − 𝑄 ) . (A.4)
etail firms that yet did not find a store to locate in have the following
resent-discounted profits Q : 
𝑄 = − 𝑧 ( 𝜂) + 𝜆( 𝑆 − 𝑄 ) . (A.5)
here z ( 𝜂) are search costs and 𝜂 is search effort of retail firms and
indicates the chance that a retail owner finds a store. Because of a
ompetitive market, 𝜂 is chosen optimally and Q will be equal to zero.
ash bargaining implies that the store owners’ share 𝛽 of their own
urplus, 𝑅 − 𝑉 , is equal to the retail firms’ share, (1 − 𝛽) , of their own
urplus S . Consequently: 
1 − 𝛽) 𝑆 = 𝛽( 𝑅 − 𝑉 ) . (A.6)
hese four equations, combined with the first-order condition of
A.2) that the present-discounted value of expected profits of a vacant
hop is maximised with respect to advertising expenditure c ( e ), imply
hat in equilibrium, p, v and e are determined by the following three
quations: 
 = 
𝑓 (1 − 𝛽) 
(
𝑣 ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) + 𝑚 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) 
)
− ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 𝑣𝛽𝑐( 𝑒 ) 
(1 − 𝛽) 𝑚 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) + 𝑣 ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 
, (A.7)
































































































′( 𝑒 ) = (1 − 𝛽)( 𝑓 + 𝑐( 𝑒 )) 𝑚 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) 
𝑒𝑟𝑣 + 𝑒𝛿
(
1 − (1 − 𝑣 ) 𝛽
) . (A.9)
We are interested in the effects of footfall on prices and vacancy
ates. Using (A.7) , it is easy to see that the partial derivative 𝜕 p / 𝜕 f > 0.
lthough interesting, we are mainly interested in general equilibrium ef-
ects on prices and vacancy rates, taking into account the effects through
hanges in advertising expenditure. We formulate the following propo-
ition: 
roposition 1. In equilibrium, (i) shop price depends positively on footfall
nd (ii) the number of vacancies depends negatively on footfall. 
roof. We first derive V, R, S and p by solving the system of Eqs. (A.2)–
A.4) and (A.6) . This leads to: 
 = (1 − 𝛽) 𝑚𝑓 − ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 𝑐𝑣 
𝑟 
(
(1 − 𝛽) 𝑚 + ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 𝑣 
) , (A.10)
 = 𝑓 ( 𝑚 + 𝑟𝑣 )(1 − 𝛽) − ( 𝑟𝛽 + 𝛿) 𝑐𝑣 
𝑟 
(
(1 − 𝛽) 𝑚 + ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 𝑣 
) , (A.11)
 = ( 𝑐 + 𝑓 ) 𝑣𝛽
𝑚 (1 − 𝛽) + 𝑣 ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 
, (A.12)
 = 𝑓 (1 − 𝛽)( 𝑣 ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) + 𝑚 ) − ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 𝑣𝛽𝑐 
(1 − 𝛽) 𝑚 + 𝑣 ( 𝑟 + 𝛿) 
. (A.13)
ote that 𝑚 = 𝑚 ( 𝑒𝑣 ) and 𝑐 = 𝑐( 𝑒 ) . First, we are interested in the ef-
ect of footfall on rents, so d p /d f . We then use Eqs. (A.7)–(A.9) , and
sing implicit differentiation. According to Cramer’s rule, d 𝑝 ∕d 𝑓 =
et ( 𝑍 𝑝 )∕ det ( 𝑍) , where: 
 = 
⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 











1 + 𝑚 
𝛿𝑣 




1− 𝛽(1− 𝑣 ) 





1− 𝛽(1− 𝑣 ) 
))
2 
⎤ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
(A.14)
ote that 𝑐 ′ = 𝜕 𝑐∕ 𝜕 𝑒 and 𝑐 ′′ = 𝜕 2 𝑐∕ 𝜕 𝑒 2 . To obtain Z p we replace the first
olumn of Z with: 
 = 
⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 
(1− 𝛽)( 𝑟𝑣 + 𝛿) 
𝑟𝑣 + 𝛿
(
1− 𝛽(1− 𝑣 ) 
)
0 
(1− 𝛽) 𝑚 ( 𝑒 ) 
𝑒𝑟𝑣 + 𝑒𝛿
(
1− 𝛽(1− 𝑣 ) 
)
⎤ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
(A.15)
o obtain det( Z e ) and det( Z v ), we replace respectively the second and
hird column of Z with z . We then take into account that 𝑚 = 𝛿(1 − 𝑣 )




det ( 𝑍 𝑝 ) 
det ( 𝑍) 
= (1 − 𝛽)( 𝑟𝑣 + 𝛿) 
Δ




det ( 𝑍 𝑒 ) 
det ( 𝑍) 
= (1 − 𝑣 )(1 − 𝛽) 𝛿
Δ𝑒𝑐 ′′




det ( 𝑍 𝑣 ) 
det ( 𝑍) 
= − (1 − 𝑣 ) 
2 (1 − 𝛽) 𝛿𝑣 
Δ𝑒 2 𝑐 ′′
< 0 (A.18)
here Δ = 𝑟𝑣 + 𝛿
(
1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝑣 ) 
)
. Because 𝛽 < 1, the impact of footfall on
ents is positive, d p /d f > 0. Furthermore, because the cost function is
onvex, we have c ″ > 0, so that d e /d f > 0. This implies that advertis-
ng expenditure will increase when footfall is higher. Consequently,
hen advertising expenditure increases, the matching rate will also in-
rease implying that d v /d f < 0 (see Eq. (A.8) , which is confirmed by
q. (A.18) ). □
The model implies that the marginal effect of footfall on prices is
ositive, but always smaller than or equal to the marginal revenue whichs equal to one (when 𝛽 = 0 , so when retail firms have all bargaining
ower, then d 𝑝 ∕d 𝑓 = 1 . The intuition for the result that d v /d f < 0 is that
tore owners’ opportunity cost of not filling a vacant shop increases with
ootfall. 
2. Endogenous footfall 
Until now, we assumed that footfall is exogenous. However, footfall
ikely depends negatively on the vacancy rate of shops in the shopping
treet, and is therefore endogenous. To take this feature into account,
e allow footfall in the shopping street to fall with the vacancy rate
f shops. More specifically, we assume that footfall is proportional to
he occupancy rate of shops. Hence, 𝑓 = (1 − 𝑣 ) 𝑓 where 𝑓 is the footfall
enerated when all shops are occupied by retail firms. This assumption
mplies that there is a negative external effect of vacant shops, because
 vacant shop reduces footfall. To investigate the effects of f and 𝑓 on
rices and vacancies, we make the simplifying assumption that 𝑐 = 𝑒 2 ∕2 ,
o that 𝑐 ′′( 𝑒 ) = 1 . We then formulate the following proposition: 
roposition 2. When footfall is proportional to the occupancy rate of
hops, (i) d 𝑝 ∕d 𝑓 > d 𝑝 ∕d 𝑓 and (ii) d 𝑣 ∕d 𝑓 < d 𝑣 ∕d 𝑓 . 




= − 𝛿𝑣 (1 − 𝑣 ) 
3 (1 − 𝛽) 
Δ𝑒 2 𝑐 ′′ − (1 − 𝑣 ) 2 (1 − 𝛽) 𝛿𝑣 𝑓 
. (A.19)
e also obtain the second derivative with respect to 𝑓 : 
d 2 𝑣 
d 𝑓 2 
= − (1 − 𝑣 ) 
5 𝑣 2 (1 − 𝛽) 2 𝛿2 
( 𝑒 2 Δ𝑐 ′′ − (1 − 𝑣 ) 2 (1 − 𝛽) 𝛿𝑣 𝑓 ) 2 
< 0 . (A.20)
sing implicit differentiation, it should hold that: 
d 𝑝 
d 𝑓 
= d 𝑝 
d 𝑓 
∕ d 𝑓 
d 𝑓 
and d 𝑣 
d 𝑓 
= d 𝑣 
d 𝑓 
∕ d 𝑓 
d 𝑓 
. (A.21)




= − d 𝑣 
d 𝑓 
𝑓 + (1 − 𝑣 ) > 1 , (A.22)
mplying that −d 𝑣 d 𝑓 > d 𝑓 . Because d 2 𝑣 ∕d 𝑓 2 < 0 , this condition
olds. □
ppendix B 
1. Historic data 
In our empirical framework we use historic data going back to 1930.
rom SpinLab we gather information on the exact location of cinemas
n 1930, as well as in 2010. It appears that in 1930 there were 315 cin-
mas, while in 2010 this was 180. In Fig. B.1 (a) we show the spatial
istribution of cinemas in 1930 and 2010. Unsurprisingly, cinemas in
930 were mainly concentrated in cities. When replicating Fig. 1 , but
dding cinemas in 1930, we see that there are 17 cinemas located in
he central shopping district, as shown in Fig. B.2 , which are particu-
arly concentrated in high-footfall parts of the shopping district. Also
or other cities, historic cinemas seem to be particularly concentrated
n high footfall areas of shopping streets. This suggests a strong auto-
orrelation of shopping streets of the past with current ones. On the
ther hand, the current locational preferences for cinemas seems to have
hanged somewhat: a decent share of the cinemas is now located in the
uburbs close to highway ramps. Indeed, in Table B.1 we show that the
umber of cinemas in 2010 within 200 m of a shop is more than 50%
ower than it was in 1930. On average, the number of cinemas within
00 m in 1930 is about 0.7, with a few locations having 6 cinemas in
lose vicinity. 
We further use data from HISGIS . These data are based on a digitised
nd geocoded version of the first Dutch census of 1830. It is the oldest
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Fig. B.1. Maps of historic data. 
















c  ationwide registration system of property and land ownership, which
as then used to determine land and property taxes. We have informa-
ion on the footprint size of each building and for each parcel we have
nformation on the owner and the owner’s occupation. Based on the oc-
upation and whether there was a building located on the parcel, we
etermine whether a building was used as a shop. More specifically, we
ave a list of a slightly more than 10 thousand occupations. We went
hrough them one by one to determine whether the person is likely toell something – so that his or her building can be qualified as a shop.
ince the year 1832 was a time before industrialisation started in the
etherlands (and therefore many people were craftsmen), we classify
bout one third of the occupations as (related to) retail. In Fig. B.1 (b)
e show the study area and the general spatial distribution of shops in
832. Unsurprisingly, they were located in built-up areas. Looking more
losely at Amsterdam in Fig. B.2 , we see that shops are particularly con-
entrated in what is Amsterdam’s main shopping street: the Kalverstraat.
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Fig. B.3. Histograms of main independent variables. 
Table B.1 
Descriptive statistics for historic variables. 
Panel A: Strabo data (1) (2) (3) (4) 
mean sd min max 
Number of cinemas in 1930, < 200 m 0.680 0.923 0 6 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m 0.322 0.590 0 4 
Number of shops in 1832, < 200 m 173.4 156.0 0 595 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m 388.6 316.4 0 1642 
Cadastral income (in guilders per hectare) 4237 4701 10.88 176,755 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 0.202 0.402 0 1 
Panel B: Locatus data (1) (2) (3) (4) 
mean sd min max 
Number of cinemas in 1930, < 200 m 0.701 0.981 0 6 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m 0.308 0.554 0 4 
Number of shops in 1832, < 200 m 153.9 160.6 0 654 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m 256.1 242.9 0 1179 
Cadastral income (in guilders per hectare) 4183 6523 2.258 520,298 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 0.256 0.436 0 1 
Notes : For the Strabo data, the number of observations is 4378 for data from 
1930 and 2496 for the data from 1832. For Locatus it is 410,544 for 1930 and 




































𝐾  For each parcel we also have information on the so-called Cadas-
ral Income , which is a proxy of the land value, as land and property
axes were based on this value. We report descriptive statistics for the
ariables in Table B.1 . On average there are around 160 shops within
00 m. This number is slightly higher than the current number of shops
n the vicinity (see Tables 1 and 2 ). This is likely because buildings
ere smaller in the past and also maybe because of our shop defini-
ion in 1832. The average of the Cadastral income per hectare is about
 thousand Guilders. However, for some parcels, it is much higher.
able B.1 also shows that for about 25% of our observations, Cadas-
ral income is missing, which is either due to missing information ( e.g.
or the province of Overijssel, we do not have information on the Cadas-ral income), or because there was no land at that time. Large parts of
he Netherlands (such as Flevoland and areas close to Amsterdam) have
een reclaimed from the sea in more recent years. 
2. Histograms 
Fig. B.3 shows histograms of footfall and the number of shops within
00 m, respectively, for the Strabo and Locatus datasets. Both figures
how that there are relative few observations with the lowest values of
ootfall and number of shops. Most of our observations are located in
elatively dense areas where footfall is between 10,000 and 25,000, and
he number of shops within 200 m (from a shop) is between 100 and
50 shops (see Fig. B.3 (a) and (b)). The distributions of the Locatus data
re similar, although the distribution of footfall is more skewed to the
ight (see Fig. B.3 (c)). 
ppendix C 
1. Estimating heterogeneous parameters 
We aim to estimate: 
og 𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑗 + 𝜓 𝑖 ∈𝑘 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 . (C.1)
here 𝛼i and 𝛽 i are retail firm specific parameters. 
Following Bishop and Timmins (2018) we can condition out the fixed
ffects by taking a Taylor series expansion around observation i . Let then
og ̃𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 , log ̃𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 and ?̃? 𝑖𝑗𝑡 denote demeaned values. We then estimate: 






𝑧 𝑖𝑘 − 𝑧 𝑘 
ℎ 
) 
× ( log ̃𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 log ̃𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 ̃𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) 2 . (C.2)
here z ik are retail firm characteristics, where 𝑘 = 1 , … , 𝒦 and K ( · ) is
 kernel function: 
 
( 






𝑤 𝑖𝑘 ( 𝑧 𝑖𝑘 , ℎ ) , (C.3)
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Fig. C.1. Cross-validation scores. 
Table C.1 
Heterogeneity: first-step results. 
Panel A: No instruments 𝜀 I,f 𝜀 I,N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 
?̂? 0.3087 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3148 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3247 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1896 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1986 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2087 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0373) 
Number of observations 4378 4378 
Cost parameter, 𝜅 0.426 0.426 
Bandwidth, h ∗ 0.611 0.64 
Panel B: Cinemas in 1930 𝜀 I,f 𝜀 I,N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 
?̂? 0.4767 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5129 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.56 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5206 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5268 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5364 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1002) (0.1023) (0.106) (0.1372) (0.1388) (0.1416) 
Number of observations 4,378 4,378 
Cost parameter, 𝜅 0.426 0.426 
Bandwidth, h ∗ 0.629 0.86 
Notes : In all regressions we include shop and location characteristics, as well as shopping street fixed effects, 
retail sector × branch fixed effects and year fixed effects. The estimated elasticities are based on estimates of the 
corresponding semi-elasticity of vacancies with respect to shopping externalities. We recover 𝜀 𝑓,𝑁 = 𝜀 𝐼,𝑁 ∕ 𝜀 𝐼,𝑓 . 
In Panels B and C we take a control function approach, where we use respectively cinemas in 1930 and shops 
in 1832 as instruments. Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replication) are clustered at the postcode and in 






















t  here w ik are kernel weights. We solely use categorical firm character-
stics. That is, we use identifier variables for each retail firm, identified
y its chain (if any), the 2-digit retail industry, 5-digit retail sector and
he 8-digit retail branch, as well as two indicators whether the shop
s small (lowest 25th percentile), medium or large (highest 25th per-
entile). Following Racine and Li (2004) and Racine et al. (2006) , we
efine: 
 𝑖𝑘 = 
{ 
1 𝑧 𝑖𝑘 = 𝑧 𝑘 
ℎ 𝑧 𝑖𝑘 ≠ 𝑧 𝑘 (C.4)
he above specification of the kernel ensures that observations that are
art of the same chain (and therefore share the same branch code) andccupy shops of similar sizes have a weight of 1. More generally, retail
rms that are more similar in observable firm characteristics ( e.g. belong
o the same industry) will have a higher kernel weight in the regression
f i and therefore have more similar parameters ?̂?𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 
An important parameter in the kernel function is the bandwidth
 , which governs the degree of smoothing. Note that h is between 0
nd 1, with ℎ = 0 implying that we include interaction terms of ?̃? 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
nd ?̃? 𝑖𝑗𝑡 with each unique combination of z ik . When ℎ = 1 , we obtain
dentical parameters for each firm, which are the same as the OLS
esults. 
The question is then what is the right choice for h . Following
he literature, we use a leave-out cross-validation procedure (see e.g.


















































































































f  ilverman, 1986 ). This implies: 
𝑉 ( ̂ℎ ) = arg min 





( log ̃𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 − log ̃𝑝 − 𝑖𝑗𝑡 ( ℎ )) 2 (C.5)
ecause errors are likely correlated within postcodes, we do not leave
ne observation out at a time, but all observations within a postcode
see Opsomer et al., 2001 ). 
We would finally like to make a note on how to use instrumental
ariables in this setting. When using semi-parametric models as above,
tandard two-stage least squares estimates yield inconsistent estimates
 Blundell and Powell, 2003 ). As in Koster et al. (2014) , we therefore rely
n a control function approach, where the first-stage residual is inserted
n the second stage as a control function. As a first stage, we then have:
og 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖 log 𝑧 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 ℎ 𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑 𝑗 + ?̃? 𝑖 ∈𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (C.6)
here 𝜉ijt is the first-stage residual. The second stage yields: 
og 𝑝 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 log 𝑠 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑥 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 ℎ 𝑖𝑗 + 𝜌𝑖 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑗 + 𝜓 𝑖 ∈𝑘 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 . (C.7)
here 𝜌𝑖 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑡 captures the ‘control function’. 
2. Determining the bandwidth 
In Fig. C.1 we show the cross-validation scores for 4 different speci-
cations. We show that for most specifications, the optimal bandwidth
s around 0.65. Only when looking at the impact of number of shops on
ents, while instrumenting with the number of cinemas in 1930, we find
 somewhat higher bandwidth, equal to 0.86 (see Fig. C.1 (d)). 
We also make sure that the optimal bandwidths do not change con-
iderably once we pursue a leave-one-out cross-validation approach
ather than leaving one postcode out at a time. It appears that the opti-
al bandwidths are then only maximally 5% smaller. 
3. Other results of the first step 
Here we report additional results of the first step of the estimation
rocedure. Hence, we calculate the elasticity of rental income with re-
pect to footfall, 𝜀 I,f and the elasticity of rental income with respect to
he number of shops 𝜀 I,N . To be able to do this we use 𝜕 v ij / 𝜕 log s ij from
ables 6 and 7 . Note that these estimates are assumed to be the same
or all firms. We further assume that 𝜅 = 0 . 426 , in line with Section 5.3 .
We report results in Table C.1 , where we report the relevant elas-
icities for the 25th percentile, the median and the 25th percentile. We
alculate cluster-bootstrapped standard errors. It is again confirmed that
here is limited heterogeneity. Moreover, the results are often quite pre-
ise, in particular when we do not instrument for footfall and the number
f shops. 
ppendix D 
1. First-stage results 
We report first-stage results when using the Strabo dataset in
able D.1 . Columns (1) and (2) use the number of cinemas in 1930 to
xplain the current footfall. The instrument is sufficiently strong with
n F -statistic exceeding 40. The coefficients imply that a standard de-
iation increase in the number of cinemas in 1930 increases footfall by
bout 12%. This effect is essentially the same regardless of controlling
or the number of cinemas in 2010. 
In columns (3)–(5) of Table D.1 we use instruments based on data
rom 1832. It appears that the number of shops in 1832 is a strong deter-
inant of current footfall: a standard deviation increase in the number
f shops in 1832 raises current footfall by about 35%. The coefficient
s insensitive to the inclusion of control variables, such as Cadastral In-
ome (column (4)) and the number of buildings in 1832 (column (5)). Columns (6)–(10) in Table D.1 repeat the same set of specifications,
ut now we use the number of shops as the endogenous variable. The
esults suggest that the instruments have very similar impacts on the
umber of shops as on footfall. We note that this does not always fold for
ontrol variables. For example, while the number of cinemas in 2010 has
 negative impact on footfall, it does not have a statistically significant
mpact on the number of shops (see columns (2) and (7)). Furthermore,
adastral Income seems to have a positive impact on the number of
hops, while the impact on footfall is not significantly different from
ero (see columns (4) and (9)). 
For completeness we also report the first-stage results when relying
n the Locatus data in Table D.2 . The number of observations is almost
00 times higher, but the first-stage results are qualitatively and quan-
itatively very similar to the ones reported in Table D.1 
2. Omitted variable bias revisited 
In the empirical literature, non-experimental papers often investigate
oefficient movements of the variables of interest after the inclusion of
dditional control variables to obtain information on whether omitted
ariable bias is important. Oster (2019) argues that solely using coeffi-
ient movements is not sufficient. Instead, she argues that the potential
ias depends on the statistical relevance of the added control variables
n explaining the dependent variable, together with any coefficient move-
ents. Here, we investigate the effect of two types of additional control
ariables, shop and location characteristics, whereas we keep a range of
xed effects (year fixed effects, shopping district fixed effects, shopping
treet fixed effects, retail sector X chain fixed effects) as basic controls. 
Oster (2019) derives an estimator to correct estimates for omitted
ariable bias. The idea is that the increase in the R 2 when adding ad-
itional control variables is informative on the magnitude of the bias
hen these additional control variables are correlated to unobservables.
or this GMM-estimator, there are two key input parameters that have
o be determined. First, there is the maximum R 2 from a hypothetical
egression of rents on footfall or number of shops and all theoretically
ossible controls, which we denote as ?̄? 2 . We set ?̄? 2 to 1, which will am-
lify any potential bias, as it is plausible that ?̄? 2 will be (much) lower
han 1 (see Oster, 2019 ). Second, a parameter must be chosen that de-
ermines the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved
ariables, which we denote by 𝜔 . Although this parameter is fundamen-
ally unknown, Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019) show that 𝜔 = 1
s a reasonable (upper-bound) value. It appears that: 
∗ ≈ ?̂? − 𝜔 ( ̊𝛼 − ̂𝛼) ?̄? 
2 − ?̂? 2 
?̂? 2 − ?̊? 2 
, (D.1)
here 𝛼∗ is the bias-corrected estimate for the effect of footfall on rents.
̂ is the parameter estimate obtained from a regression which includes
ll controls, so the additional controls (i.e. shop and location character-
stics) and basic controls (different types of fixed effects), and ?̂? 2 is the
orresponding R 2 . ?̊? is the parameter estimate obtained from a regres-
ion with the basic controls and ?̊? 2 is the corresponding R 2 . Hence, this
quation provides a straightforward way to evaluate robustness of the
esults. We report bootstrapped bias-corrected estimates in Table D.3 ,
hich replicates the baseline table for rents (see Table 3 ). 
In columns (1)–(3) we replicate the results for footfall. Compared
o the baseline estimates, the coefficients are very similar and differ
aximally 2.6 percentage points from the baseline estimate. For the
referred specification in column (3) the bias-corrected estimate is only
.33 percentage points (1.2%) higher. For number of shops the differ-
nce between the baseline estimates and the bias-corrected estimates are
till small, albeit somewhat larger. For column (4), the difference is 3.6
ercentage points, while for the preferred specification the difference
s 1.56 percentage points. Furthermore, when looking at the standard
rrors, the bias-corrected estimates are not statistically significantly dif-
erent from the OLS specifications. We therefore conclude that omitted
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Table D.1 
First-stage results for Strabo data. 
Dependent variable: log of footfall Dependent variable: log of the number of shops < 200 m 
Cinemas in 1910 Number of shops in 1832 Cinemas in 1910 Number of shops in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Number of cinemas in 1930, < 200 m (std) 0.1175 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1295 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1237 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1251 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0177) (0.0183) 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m (std) − 0.0509 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0059 
(0.0169) (0.0143) 
Number of shops in 1832, < 200 m (std) 0.3533 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3601 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3462 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4186 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4594 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3658 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0637) (0.0630) (0.0817) (0.0644) (0.0583) (0.0982) 
Cadastral income (log) 0.0448 0.0444 0.1338 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1308 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0380) (0.0382) (0.0503) (0.0505) 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 0.8952 ∗ ∗ 0.8927 ∗ ∗ 0.8723 ∗ 0.8551 ∗ 
(0.4096) (0.4103) (0.4484) (0.4507) 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m (std) 0.0168 0.1132 
(0.0709) (0.1165) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4378 4378 2496 2496 4378 4378 4378 2496 2496 
R 2 0.780 0.781 0.780 0.776 0.776 0.838 0.838 0.839 0.861 0.861 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction 
year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location 
characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, 
public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 
p < 0.10 
Table D.2 
First-stage results for Locatus data. 
Dependent variable: log of footfall Dependent variable: log of the number of shops < 200 m 
Cinemas in 1910 Number of shops in 1832 Cinemas in 1910 Number of shops in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Number of cinemas in 1930, < 200 m (std) 0.0965 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1028 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1438 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1480 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0084) (0.0086) 
Number of cinemas in 2010, < 200 m (std) − 0.0258 ∗ ∗ − 0.0175 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0109) (0.0067) 
Number of shops in 1832, < 200 m (std) 0.3841 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3926 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2904 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3938 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4361 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4361 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0360) (0.0356) (0.0522) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Cadastral income (log) − 0.0267 − 0.0273 0.0025 0.0025 
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Cadastral income is zero in 1832 − 0.4569 ∗ − 0.4617 ∗ − 0.1292 − 0.1292 
(0.2452) (0.2456) (0.0914) (0.0914) 
Number of buildings in 1832, < 200 m (std) 0.1199 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0462) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 410,544 410,544 410,544 218,271 218,271 410,544 410,544 410,544 218,271 218,271 
R 2 0.689 0.690 0.691 0.696 0.696 0.789 0.790 0.785 0.834 0.834 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include building surface and construction year dummies, which are categorised as 
follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location characteristics include whether the property 
is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway 












e  ariables are unlikely to play an important role, which is in line with
any other sensitivity checks. 
3. Sensitivity for retail rents 
In this Appendix section we illustrate the robustness of the results
or the Strabo data. We first estimate several regressions that should con-ribute to the belief that our identification strategy is valid. Table D.4 re-
orts the results. 
In Panel A we focus on footfall and in Panel B on the number of
hops. We first consider an alternative identification strategy where we
ompare shops near shopping street intersections. Hence, rather than
dentifying the effects within shopping streets, we now compare differ-
nces in footfall and number of shops between shopping streets that in-
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Table D.3 
Bias-corrected results for retail rents. 
Footfall Number of shops 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Footfall (log) 0.4000 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3108 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2642 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0183) (0.0277) (0.0274) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) 0.2150 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2000 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1669 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0307) (0.0607) (0.0584) 
Additional controls 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Basic controls 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
?̄? 2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
𝜔 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Number of observations 4378 4378 4378 4378 4378 4378 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. We include the fixed effects (at the year, shopping 
district, shopping street and/or retail sector × chain) as controls that are assumed to be unrelated to the set of 
proportionally related unobservables. The construction year dummies are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–
1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location characteristics 
include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious 
buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Bootstrapped 
standard errors (250 replications) are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ 
p < 0.10. 
Table D.4 
Retail rents: Identification revisited. 
(Dependent variable: log of rent per m 2 ) 
Intersection fixed effects Real estate agent fixed effects Sales prices 
Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 
Panel A: Footfall (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
Footfall (log) 0.2146 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3158 ∗ ∗ 0.4324 0.2069 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3825 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3136 0.1991 ∗ 0.1591 
(0.0218) (0.1541) (0.3481) (0.0262) (0.0994) (0.1934) (0.1063) (0.1800) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Intersection fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Real estate agent fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4136 4136 2340 4378 4378 2496 110 110 
R 2 0.836 0.722 0.414 0.997 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 23.40 5.418 43.38 14 
Endogeneity test 0.624 0.447 4.296 0.169 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.430 0.504 0.0382 0.681 
Panel B: Number of shops (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) 0.1662 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2761 ∗ 0.6279 0.1330 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4613 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2901 0.0753 0.1368 
(0.0325) (0.1435) (0.5772) (0.0406) (0.1368) (0.2163) (0.0893) (0.1833) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Intersection fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Real estate agent fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4136 4136 2340 4378 4378 2496 110 110 
R 2 0.830 0.716 0.391 0.996 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 34.41 5.698 35.79 10.70 
Endogeneity test 0.886 1.281 9.882 0.864 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.346 0.258 0.00167 0.353 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated 
and construction year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 
1991–2000, > 2000. Location characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious 
buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode 
and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10 
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Table D.5 
Retail rents and footfall: Non-linear effects and internalisation. 
(Dependent variable: log of rent per m 2 ) 
Non-linear effects Multi-property owners Private investors Retail associations 
Cinemas Shops Cinemas Shops Cinemas Shops2 Cinemas Shops 
in 1930 in 1832 in 1930 in 1832 in 1930 in 1832 in 1930 in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Footfall (log) – Footfall ( 𝑙𝑜𝑔) 0.2952 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4455 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4123 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0201) (0.1000) (0.1664) 
(Footfall (log) – Footfall ( 𝑙𝑜𝑔) ) 2 0.0582 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2127 0.2297 
(0.0106) (0.4135) (0.3332) 
Footfall (log) 0.2430 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2132 0.1994 0.2534 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2734 0.5454 ∗ 0.2626 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4279 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4562 ∗ 
(0.0391) (0.2848) (0.2540) (0.0284) (0.2112) (0.2859) (0.0187) (0.1039) (0.2336) 
Footfall (log) × − 0.0011 0.3170 − 0.0539 
Multi-property owner (0.0615) (0.3432) (0.3127) 
Multi-property owner 0.0249 − 3.0065 0.5290 
(0.5862) (3.2847) (2.9892) 
Footfall (log) × 0.0167 0.2363 − 0.0964 
Private investor (0.0280) (0.1728) (0.1115) 
Private investor − 0.1487 − 2.1945 0.9297 
(0.2623) (1.6172) (1.0475) 
Footfall (log) × − 0.0201 − 0.2104 0.1951 
in retail association area (0.0519) (0.6367) (0.4743) 
In retail association area 0.1478 1.8835 − 1.7623 
(0.4934) (6.0040) (4.4137) 
Shop and location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4378 2496 1614 1614 900 3565 3565 2047 4378 4378 2496 
R 2 0.823 0.891 0.825 0.821 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 0.684 1.308 3.604 4.778 5.605 5.980 1.127 6.056 
Endogeneity test 3.555 0.576 2.495 0.302 11.11 1.453 4.614 2.598 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.169 0.750 0.287 0.860 0.00387 0.484 0.0996 0.273 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. The construction year dummies are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–
1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of 
geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors 



















































ersect. 44 We then only keep observations within 250 m of an intersec-
ion and include unique fixed effects for each shopping street intersec-
ion. We show that the results are very much comparable to the baseline
pecifications. By using spatial variation in footfall between intersecting
treets, we control for unobserved locational endowments that attract
oth shoppers and retail firms ( e.g. free parking etc.). The coefficients
hen using cinemas in 1930 as an instrument (column (2)) seem some-
hat lower, but they appear not to be statistically significantly different
rom the baseline estimates. The coefficients when using the number of
hops in 1832 are not statistically significant at conventional levels. This
s mainly because with so many local fixed effects, the instrument is not
ufficiently strong. 
One may argue that different real estate agents have different bar-
aining power or sales strategies, which may lead to different observed
ents and/or unreported incentives. In columns (4)–(6), we make sure
hat when including real estate agent fixed effects the results do not ma-
erially change. Again, it is shown that the coefficients using the number
f shops in 1832 become imprecise when including this additional set
f fixed effects. However, the point estimates still have a similar mag-
itude. 
To avoid any reverse causality between rents or vacancy rates and
hopping externalities, we may also consider to use sales price directly.
he main reason why we do not prefer this is that only a very small
hare of transactions are sales transactions. Hence, it appears that for44 Because people follow certain routes for their shopping trips, footfall 
trongly differs between intersecting streets. On average, the high-footfall street 





i  ur sample period and for shopping streets we are left with only 110
bservations. This implies that we cannot include as many fixed effects
nd controls as in the baseline specifications. Also, the instruments ap-
ear not to have sufficient power to lead to meaningful results with this
ow number of observations. Keeping these caveats in mind, in Panel
, column (7) we only control for shop characteristics and year fixed
ffects. We then find a positive effect of footfall on sales prices, which
s surprisingly close to the baseline estimate for rental income. When
e control for shopping street fixed effects in Panel A, column (8), the
oint estimate remains similar but the coefficient becomes very impre-
ise. This is confirmed by regressions of the sales price on the number
f shops. The point estimates are very comparable to the baseline esti-
ates, but are too imprecise to draw any strong conclusions. 
In Tables D.5 and D.6 we investigate whether non-linear effects are
elevant and, importantly, whether there is any evidence that shop own-
rs internalise shopping externalities. 
In columns (1)–(3) of Table D.5 we show the results of the main rent
pecifications using the demeaned log footfall and its square, instead
f the annual log footfall. In column (1) we estimate the preferred OLS
pecification. We find evidence that the elasticity of rents with respect
o footfall is increasing in footfall. However, when instrumenting for
ootfall, this coefficient becomes highly statistically insignificant (see
olumns (2) and (3) in Panel A). 
As we mentioned in the introduction, policy intervention fostering
he concentration of footfall-generating retail activities can be welfare
mproving only if the external effect of footfall is not internalised. In the
ntroduction we argued that internalisation is unlikely to occur in the
etherlands due to the fragmentation of shop ownership, in particular
n shopping streets. As an empirical test for this argument, we use the
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Table D.6 
Retail rents and number of shops: Non-linear effects and internalisation. 
(Dependent variable: log of rent per m 2 ) 
Non-linear effects Multi-property owners Private investors Shop associations 
Cinemas Shops Cinemas Shops Cinemas Shops2 Cinemas Shops 
in 1930 in 1832 in 1930 in 1832 in 1930 in 1832 in 1930 in 1832 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) – 0.3152 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4927 ∗ 0.4818 ∗ 
Number of shops , < 200 𝑚 ( 𝑙𝑜𝑔) (0.0333) (0.2774) (0.2696) 
(Number of shops, < 200 m (log) – 0.0620 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.3411 0.1304 
Number of shops , < 200 𝑚 ( 𝑙𝑜𝑔) ) 2 (0.0102) (1.2955) (0.1032) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) 0.1473 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3839 0.1719 0.1132 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3111 ∗ ∗ 0.4388 0.1464 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4796 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5616 
(0.0533) (0.3149) (0.2221) (0.0426) (0.1551) (0.3084) (0.0329) (0.1292) (0.3626) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) × 0.0124 0.0439 − 0.0440 
Multi-property owner (0.0492) (0.1678) (0.1711) 
Multi-property owner − 0.0460 − 0.1860 0.2129 
(0.2314) (0.7926) (0.7877) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) × 0.0685 ∗ 0.2558 ∗ ∗ − 0.0546 
Private investor (0.0366) (0.1152) (0.1318) 
Private investor − 0.3277 ∗ − 1.2188 ∗ ∗ 0.2660 
(0.1765) (0.5473) (0.6224) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) × 0.1164 − 0.2975 0.1251 
In shop association area (0.0751) (0.1950) (0.3570) 
In shop association area − 0.5446 1.2871 − 1.0005 
(0.3517) (0.8902) (1.4824) 
Shop and location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4378 2496 1614 1614 900 3565 3565 2047 4378 4378 2496 
R 2 0.812 0.885 0.812 0.807 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 0.108 2.948 2.573 12.38 16.34 8.804 21.75 8.742 
Endogeneity test 2.914 0.505 3.020 0.434 14.20 6.742 13.31 3.329 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.233 0.777 0.221 0.805 0.000826 0.0344 0.00129 0.189 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. The construction year dummies are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–
1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of 
geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10 
Table D.7 
Retail rants and number of shops: Different thresholds. 
Number of shops < 100m Number of shops < 250m 
Baseline Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 Baseline Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 
specification < 100m < 100m specification < 250m < 250m 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Number of shops, < 100m (log) 0.1393 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5644 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3177 
(0.0198) (0.1891) (0.2258) 
Number of shops, < 250m (log) 0.1384 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.5057 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.4010 
(0.0353) (0.1329) (0.3044) 
Shop characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retail sector × chain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Real estate agent fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4378 4109 2342 4378 4109 2342 
R 2 0.809 0.806 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 16.16 21.01 38.33 9.559 
Endogeneity test 8.427 0.876 12.15 1.335 
Notes : Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction year dummies, which 
are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. 
Location characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious 
buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the postcode and in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10 
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Table D.8 
Vacancies: Identification revisited. 
(Dependent variable: shop is vacant) 
Intersection fixed effects Booms and busts Probit models 
Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 
Panel A: Footfall (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Probit IVProbit IVProbit 
Footfall (log) − 0.0304 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0616 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0500 ∗ − 0.0276 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0575 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0012 − 0.0313 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0702 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0214 
(0.0016) (0.0176) (0.0258) (0.0015) (0.0098) (0.0155) (0.00116) (0.0118) (0.0155) 
Footfall (log) × bust − 0.0124 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0123 ∗ ∗ − 0.0296 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0013) (0.0057) (0.0063) 
Shop and location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intersection fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 394,389 394,389 207,242 410,544 410,544 218,271 405,947 405,947 215,036 
R 2 0.0448 0.0448 
Log-likelihood − 86,041 − 434,705 − 229,460 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 37.37 9.777 42.33 22.20 
Endogeneity test 3.423 0.743 12.07 8.810 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.0643 0.389 0.00239 0.0122 
Panel B: Number of shops (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Probit IVProbit IVProbit 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) − 0.0492 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0559 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0447 ∗ ∗ − 0.0438 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0443 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0022 − 0.0439 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0563 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0199 
(0.0037) (0.0158) (0.0228) (0.0031) (0.0080) (0.0130) (0.00254) (0.00848) (0.0154) 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) × bust − 0.0121 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0177 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0299 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0054) 
Shop and location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intersection fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Shopping street fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 394,389 394,389 207,242 410,544 410,544 218,271 405,947 405,947 215,036 
R 2 0.0409 0.0406 
Log-likelihood − 86,767 − 120,178 − 44,143 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 233.9 75.33 142.7 48.83 
Endogeneity test 0.194 0.188 1.462 29.48 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.660 0.665 0.481 0.0000 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. Shop characteristics include property size, whether the building is new or renovated and construction 
year dummies, which are categorised as follows: < 1832, 1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location 
characteristics include whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops < 200 m, 
public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. For the Probit models we report average marginal effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
















































t  nformation of shop owner name and shop owner type, which is avail-
ble in the Strabo property dataset in order to test whether different
wnership statuses yield different estimates of the effect of footfall on
etail rents. As mentioned in Section 3.1 , information on shop owner
ame is available for about one third of the sample that we use in the
ent analysis. When this information is available, we count whether the
wner rented out more properties in the same shopping street in our
tudy period. 
In columns (4)–(6) in Table D.5 we report the results using the inter-
ction variable with footfall. In all specifications we do not find any sta-
istically significant difference between single and multi-property own-
rs. Columns (5)–(9) uses again two interaction terms with footfall; one
hat indicates whether the investor/owner is a private investor and the
ther whether the investor/owner is listed as real estate investor ( e.g.
eal estate agencies, pension funds, construction companies etc.). The
atter might internalise shopping externalities to some extent when the
nvestor owns multiple properties in a shopping street or district. How-
ver, the coefficients of log footfall for private and real estate investors
re virtually the same. We do not find statistically significant effects for
he interaction effect. In columns (10)–(12) we include an interaction
erm with a dummy indicating whether a shop is part of an area-based
etail association. These retail associations may offer public goods, such
s advertisement for the shopping district and Christmas lightning, but
hey may also offer coordination strategies to reduce vacancies and, pos-
ibly, to internalise shopping externalities. However, we do not find ev-dence for the latter – the coefficients capturing the interaction effect is
ighly statistically insignificant. 
Overall, the results in Table D.5 confirm that any coordination
mong property owners in order to internalise shopping externalities
s very unlikely to happen in the setting of Dutch shopping streets. 
In Table D.6 we replicate these results, but now use the number
f shops within 200 m as a proxy for shopping externalities. We find
ery similar results. The only exception is that shopping externalities are
ore important when the owner is a private investor. This may indicate
hat internalisation by real estate investors may occur. However, the ef-
ect has the opposite sign once we use shops in 1832 as an instrument.
ence, we do not consider this as sufficient evidence that internalisation
s important, in particular because all other interaction terms are highly
tatistically insignificant. 
In Table D.7 we re-estimate the baseline results for the effects of
umber of shops on rents for different thresholds. The results highlight
hat the results are essentially unaffected when using 100 m or 250 m
s thresholds rather than 200 m to count the number of shops in the
icinity. We note that we use the same threshold to construct the instru-
ents. 
4. Sensitivity for vacancies 
Here we investigate the robustness of the regressions where we aim
o explain the impact of shopping externalities on the probability of a
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Table D.9 
Long-term and short-term vacancies. 
(Dependent variable: shop is vacant) 
Long-term vacancies Short-term vacancies 
Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 Cinemas in 1930 Shops in 1832 
Panel A: Footfall (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Footfall (log) − 0.0145 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0259 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0101 − 0.0133 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0212 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0178 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0011) (0.0052) (0.0081) (0.0007) (0.0044) (0.0066) 
Shop and location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 332,304 332,304 176,407 371,049 371,049 197,144 
R 2 0.0433 0.0127 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 82.50 39.98 82.66 42 
Endogeneity test 5.299 10.93 3.419 0.563 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.0213 0.000947 0.0645 0.453 
Panel B: Number of shops (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Number of shops, < 200 m (log) − 0.0198 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0223 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0092 − 0.0192 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0180 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0163 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0019) (0.0045) (0.0072) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0060) 
Shop and location characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopping street fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 332,304 332,304 176,407 371,049 371,049 197,144 
R 2 0.0407 0.0117 
Kleibergen Paap F -statistic 272.7 97.47 279.1 97.80 
Endogeneity test 0.357 15.90 0.114 0.595 
𝜉2 (2) p -value 0.550 6.69e-05 0.736 0.440 
Notes : Footfall is measured as the number of shoppers per day. The construction year dummies are categorised as follows: < 1832, 
1832–1930, 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, 1991–2000, > 2000. Location characteristics include 
whether the property is in a historic district, and the number of geocoded pictures < 200 m, religious buildings < 200 m, bus stops 
< 200 m, public buildings < 200 m, schools, and railway stations < 200 m. Robust standard errors are clustered at the postcode and in 
























































s  hop being empty. In Table D.8 we consider some robustness checks
ith respect to the identification and estimation. 
In columns (1)–(3) we consider an alternative identification strategy,
here we only keep properties within 250 m of shopping street inter-
ections and include street intersection fixed effects. Hence, rather than
dentifying the effects of shopping externalities within shopping streets,
e now identify them between shopping streets. The results indicate
hat the effects of footfall and number of shops are very comparable to
he baseline estimate. For the regressions using the number of shops in
832 as an instrument for either footfall or number of shops < 200 m
e now also find statistically significant coefficients, which is likely due
o a stronger first stage. 
In columns (4)–(6) of Table D.8 , we consider an alternative explana-
ion for the negative effect of shopping externalities on vacancies other
han the effect of increased opportunity costs of vacant properties in
xpensive areas ( i.e. with higher levels of footfall). In times of high
emand, the marginal costs of providing store space are likely to be
bove the marginal benefits for most of the shops, so footfall might not
ave a statistically significant effect on vacancy rates during a boom pe-
iod. However, in bust times because marginal costs of providing space
ay be above the marginal benefits, retail space may lie empty in ar-
as with lower rents ( i.e. with lower footfall) (see e.g. Teulings et al.,
017 ). Hence, footfall may only have an effect during busts. We test
his hypothesis by regressing a dummy for a vacant shop on the in-
eraction term between log footfall and a dummy for the recent boom
2003–2008) and bust (2009–2015) period of the Dutch economy, re-
pectively. 45 45 The actual years of recession were 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2015. We have 
lso performed the same exercise using the exact years that the economy was in 




s  What we find is that the interaction term of shopping externalities
nd the dummy indicating whether the economy is in a bust is statis-
ically significant and has the expected negative sign; hence, shopping
xternalities have a stronger impact on the probability to lie empty in
ust periods because the marginal benefits are arguably lower. In col-
mn (4) we find, for example, that when footfall increases by 10% in
oom times, the vacancy rate decreases by 0.27 percentage points. In
ust times, this is 0.40 percentage points. The effect of the number of
hops within 200 m is also stronger in bust times. The stronger effect
n bust times survives once we instrument for shopping externalities in
olumns (5) and (6). The difference between the two coefficients corrob-
rates our intuition that in times of low demand, an increase in footfall
aises marginal benefits above marginal costs for certain shops. Never-
heless, in times of high demand, the effect of footfall on vacancies is
enerally in line with the opportunity cost hypothesis: store owners’ op-
ortunity cost of not filling a vacant shop increases with footfall. Overall,
hese results suggest that the effect of footfall on vacancy rates in times
f high demand is somewhat lower but still highly statistically signifi-
ant. The only exception is when we instrument for shopping externali-
ies with the number of shops in 1832 (see column (6)). However, given
he relatively large standard error, we cannot exclude the possibility that
here is a negative effect of shopping externalities on the probability to
ie empty, which is in line with the previous results. 
In columns (7)–(9) of Table D.8 we estimate Probit models, rather
han Linear Probability Models. We note that in Probit models, fixed
ffects cannot be conditioned out, so we include dummies for shopping
treets and years. Because in non-linear Probit models, marginal effects
re not constant across observations we report average marginal effects.
he results clearly show that the results are very similar to the corre-
ponding baseline estimates reported in Tables 6 and 7 , also when we in-
trument for shopping externalities. Hence, the estimation method does
































































































Z  ot seem to matter in measuring the impact of shopping externalities on
he probability of a shop to lie empty. 
In Table D.9 we consider the differential effect shopping externalities
ay have on long-term and short-term vacancy rates. We define long-
erm vacant properties a properties that lie empty for at least 3 years,
hile short-term vacant shops are defined as being non-vacant in the
ear before. We disregard all observations that are short-term vacant in
he regressions where we explain the long-term vacancy rate and vice
ersa . It appears that, given our definitions, the average long-term va-
ancy rate in our sample is 1.6%, while the short-term vacancy rate is
.3%. 46 
In columns (1)–(3) we investigate the impact of shopping externali-
ies on the probability of a shop to remain empty for at least 3 years. The
bsolute magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller, but this is mainly
ue to a lower average probability to stay empty for a long time. The
oefficient in column (1) suggest that the probability on long-term va-
ancy is reduced by 0.15 or 0.20 percentage points – about 10% of the
ean long-term vacancy rate – when respectively footfall or the number
f shops increases by 10%. Hence, this effect is about 50% stronger com-
ared to the baseline estimate. This also holds if we instrument for shop-
ing externalities with the number of cinemas in 1930 within 200 m.
owever, when using the number of shops in 1832 as an instrument,
he coefficients are statistically insignificant. Hence, we find relatively
tronger effects on the long-term vacancy rate if we use OLS or use the
umber of cinemas in 1930 as an instrument. 
In columns (4)–(6) of Table D.9 we investigate the effects of shopping
xternalities on the short-term vacancy rate. In column (4), we find that
 10% increase in footfall or number of shops increases the probability of
 shop to become empty by respectively 0.13 and 0.19 percentage points
about 5% of the mean short-term vacancy rate. Hence, the effects are
ery comparable to the baseline estimates. We now also find statistically
ignificant negative impacts of shopping externalities on the short-term
acancy rate when using shops in 1832 as an instrument (column (6)). 
All in all, we do not find large systematic differences in the way shop-
ing externalities impact short-term and long-term vacancy rates, and
enerally both are reduced when footfall or number of shops increase
n the vicinity of a shop. 
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